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ABSTRACT 
Analyzing jihadist activity in France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain provides 
valuable insight into how the idea of global jihad resonates within different Muslim 
communities.  Initial assessments explaining the differing level of jihadist activity in each 
country focus primarily on one foreign policy item: support or opposition to the Iraq war.  
However research shows a number of other critical items which also influence the level 
of jihadist activity.  These include other foreign policy initiatives such as NATO’s lead in 
Afghanistan involving military forces from all four countries; support of “apostate” 
regimes, such as France’s involvement in Algeria; as well as perceived injustices against 
Muslims during colonial conquests.  Another critical factor is the country of origin of the 
Muslim population.  Analysis reveals that jihadist activity amongst Pakistani Muslims 
tends to be higher than with groups from other origins.  The final critical factor measured 
was the domestic policies of each country.  Policies which encourage integration and 
assimilation appear to minimize jihadist activity.  Lessons learned based on the success 
and failure in each of these countries are critical to developing long term counter 
terrorism policies and eliminating European Muslims as a support element or active 
participants for the global jihad. 
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Six years after 9/11, the United States and its allies continue to struggle with 
terrorism.  Though there is much talk of alliances, the fact is each country has taken its 
own counter terrorism approach.  Comparing these dynamics provides valuable insight 
into successful and failed programs and initiatives.  Given al Qaeda’s focus on Europe 
and numerous terrorist related plans/attacks recently, this thesis addresses western 
European efforts and struggles battling Islamic extremism.  In order to make this review 
manageable, four western European countries are being analyzed: France, Germany, 
Great Britain, and Spain.  These were selected due to the fact each has had differing 
levels of internal jihadist activity, while at the same time each country has developed its 
own domestic and foreign policy initiatives to counter its terrorist threat.  Unfortunately 
much analysis into explaining the differing level of jihadist activity in each country 
focuses on one foreign policy item: support or opposition to the Iraq war.  However 
research shows there are a number of other items just as, if not more, influential in the 
level of jihadist activity.   
One influential item is the different status levels European Muslims experience in 
each country.  Examining actual and perceived social status, employment and income 
levels, and education provides evidence French Muslims believe they are closer to 
equality than their European Muslim counterparts.  France has also distinguished itself in 
its nationalistic approach to the Muslim issue, developing a unified approach across the 
entire country.  France is the only country which makes decisions for and handles issues 
from the Muslim community at the national level.  In contrast, Spain, Britain, and 
Germany rely on local and regional governments to engage on the Muslim issue, 
resulting in a disjointed and unbalanced effort across the country. 
The varying level of sentiment towards jihad in each country’s Muslim population 
is another difference between the countries.  For example the country of origin of the 
Muslim population in each country clearly is important, with Muslims from Pakistan and 
the Middle East being particularly active.  With Great Britain having by far the most 
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Pakistani immigrants, it is logical the British have experienced the most jihadist activity.  
This is partially explained through the religiosity of Pakistani immigrants in Britain 
which is significantly higher than the more secular Muslims in other countries, especially 
the primarily Turkish population in Germany.   
Foreign policy initiatives, other than the war in Iraq, also clearly play a role in at 
least the targeting of the surveyed countries.  All four countries are involved in NATO’s 
operations in Afghanistan and have military personnel engaged in action against al Qaeda 
and Taliban elements.  In the eyes of al Qaeda and its supporters, this places each country 
as an ally of the United States.  Support of “apostate” regimes is another item that 
motivates individuals to join the jihad, including France’s involvement in Algeria, Great 
Britain’s engagement with Pakistan, and Spain’s interaction with Morocco and Algeria.  
Additionally all four countries remain heavily reliant on oil, making them inherent 
supporters of the ultimate apostate regime, Saudi Arabia.  In spite of this, France and 
Germany have thus far avoided the violent attacks conducted against Britain and Spain. 
Differing domestic strategies also influenced jihadist activity within the surveyed 
countries.  While each country dealt with terrorism of some sort over the past 30 years, 
France is the only one to deal specifically with Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11.  With this 
head start, France was better prepared to deal with the enemy, while the others struggled 
to determine what to do in this new environment.  France was also the only country to 
assimilate its Muslim immigrant population.  Spain and Britain utilized a multicultural 
approach, trying to keep Muslims isolated from the natives.  This simply highlighted the 
differences between the two communities.  Germany maintained the myth of the guest 
worker, doing little to integrate under a fake, self-imposed, concept that the Muslims 
were in country to work temporarily and would return home shortly.  While France 
tackled the issues, the other three countries kept Muslims out of sight, pushing issues 
away and isolating the Muslim community from the rest of society.   
The importance of this review is that identifying what has worked and failed in 
these four countries can begin to help develop an effective counter terrorism policy for 





On August 23, 1996, Osama bin Laden issued a Declaration of War against the 
United States and its allies for the alleged suffering they invoked upon Muslims 
worldwide.  Embedded within the declaration was a call for Muslims to rise up and 
combat Western actions and influences:  
It is no secret to you, my brothers, that the people of Islam have been 
afflicted with oppression, hostility, and injustice by the Judeo-Christian 
alliance and its supporters . . . Men of the radiant future of our umma of 
Muhammad, raise the banner of jihad up high against the Judeo-American 
alliance that has occupied the holy places of Islam . . . Cavalry of Islam, 
be mounted!1 
Although, early on, little international attention was paid to this declaration, bin 
Laden’s words and fearlessness inspired a growing number of Islamic militants.  Bin 
Laden’s focus on the “far enemy” (the United States and its Western allies) was a 
revolutionary shift from previous militant efforts focused on the “near enemy” (local 
apostate regimes).2  As a result of this shift in tactics, the newly proclaimed global jihad 
against the West became the cornerstone of al Qaeda.  Since 1996, al Qaeda and its 
affiliates have carried out terrorist attacks targeting westerners in numerous locations, 
both Muslim and non-Muslim, around the world (i.e., U.S., UK, Spain, Indonesia, Kenya, 
Morocco, Turkey).  According to bin Laden, these attacks have been carried out in 
response to the foreign policies of the United States and its allies which are perceived to 
negatively influence the Muslim population.     
Following bin Laden’s declaration of jihad, a transition from attacks within 
developing countries to developed western countries was achieved, culminating in the 
                                                 
1 Al Islah, “Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy 
Mosques,” 02 September 1996. 
2 Fawaz A. Gerges, The Far Enemy Why Jihad Went Global, (United Kingdom: Cambridge University 
Press, 2005). 
 2
attacks of September 11, 2001.  Al Qaeda and its affiliates followed up this successful 
operation by targeting countries within Europe, specifically, Madrid and London.  In 
Madrid, Spain, on March 11, 2004, ten explosions on four commuter trains occurred 
nearly simultaneously, killing 191 people and wounding more than 1,755 others.3  In 
London, England, on July 7, 2005, four bombs were detonated against the public 
transportation system killing 52 people and wounding more than 770 others.4  There has 
been speculation of al Qaeda’s direct involvement in these attacks, but what has come to 
the forefront is many of the people involved in these attacks did not have direct ties to al 
Qaeda but were inspired by al Qaeda’s message of jihad against the West.   
Since the 2005 London attacks, there have been a number of thwarted plots which 
have been uncovered within various countries throughout Europe (i.e., the 2006 liquid 
explosives plot in the UK5, the 2007 plot to attack U.S. targets in Germany6, and the 
2004 plot to blow up the Spanish National Court in Madrid7).  Additionally, bin Laden 
and his top lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri, have on many occasions called on Muslims to 
target countries within Europe.     
These events (the attacks, thwarted plots, and messages) highlight the growing 
threat of terrorist attacks within Europe.  However, more important is the fact these 
incidents were planned and carried out by homegrown terrorists—radical Muslims 
residing within Europe who chose to carry out attacks against the Western country 
providing them shelter and security.  Although in some instances, like Madrid, successful 
and planned attacks have been carried out by a combination of homegrown and foreign 
jihadists, the primary concern emanates from Muslims residing within Europe choosing 
to support the global jihad through violence within Europe.  Why have some Muslims in 
                                                 
3 British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) News Online, “Madrid Train Attacks,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/ guides/457000/457031/html/default.stm (accessed October 2007). 
4 BBC News Online, “7 July Bombings: Overview,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/ 
spl/hi/uk/05/london_blasts/what_happened/html/default.stm (accessed October 2007). 
5 BBC News Online, “Airlines terror plot disrupted,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778575.stm 
(accessed October 2007). 
6 Mark Landler, “German Police Arrest 3 in Terrorist Plot,” The New York Times, 06 September 2006. 
7 BBC News Online, “More 'bomb plot' arrests in Spain,” 04 November 2004, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3981061.stm (accessed October 2007).  
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Europe radicalized and subsequently carried out these terrorist attacks in a jihad against 
the West?  The goal of this research paper is to better understand the underlying 
motivations of these European terrorists.  The findings in this thesis uncover a few 
critical factors important in measuring the likely success or failure of jihadist support.  
These include the foreign policy initiatives of the countries, counter terrorist actions, 
integration/assimilation policies of immigrants, national origin of the Muslim 
populations, and the presence of absence of counter-radicals and surrogate or competing 
radical organizations.  Although each of these factors cannot be weighed evenly between 
one country and another, they do help to identify flags which may be raised to highlight 
potential threats to individual countries.   
B. THE QUESTION 
Over the past few decades, Muslim immigration to Europe created a minority 
population which has segments of Muslims who are angry and frustrated with their social 
status and standing.  Additionally, although the first generation of European Muslims was 
drawn to Europe as a means for an improved life, the follow-on generations (second and 
third) have found themselves struggling between their cultural roots and their 
surroundings.  This makes them primary targets by radicals playing on the sense of 
alienation within European society.  French Research Director, Olivier Roy, noted: 
“radical imams such as Abu Hamza, Abu Qatada and Omar Bakri, who specifically 
address second-generation Muslims and play on their sense of alienation and 
uprootedness.”8  
Because of its sizeable disenfranchised immigrant Muslim population (only a 
couple of generations removed from Muslim countries), the United Kingdom has fallen 
victim to a number of attacks and foiled plots being carried out within the country by 
European Muslims.  By comparison, however, a number of other Western European 
countries also have sizeable Muslim populations but have not suffered a terrorist attack to 
radicals residing within the country.  France has the largest Muslim population of all 
                                                 
8 Olivier Roy, “Britain: homegrown terror,” Le Monde Diplomatique, August 2005, 
http://mondediplo.com/2005/08/05terror (accessed October 2007). 
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Western European countries, and yet since bin Laden’s declaration of jihad, the country 
has not been attacked.  There have been numerous terror related arrests but no action.  
The French riots in late 2005 would appear to have been an opportunity for radicals to 
carry out an attack, yet no activity came to fruition.  This then leads to our primary 
question: Why are some Western European countries facing attacks from within and 
others are not?  
There are a number of possible variables to this case: the motivations of European 
Muslims to join the global jihad; al Qaeda’s global plan vs. self interests of surrogate and 
ideologically inspired forces; the heterogeneity of the European Muslim population; as 
well as European governmental immigration policies and efforts to combat terrorism.  
Although we would like to focus on each European country to get at the heart of 
this question, the scope of such an undertaking would be immense.  In an effort to include 
as many variables as possible within our analysis, we have selected four varied Western 
European countries in this study: The United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Spain.  
The selection of these countries in particular is based on their differing foreign policy 
initiatives, immigration policies, origins of Muslim populations, as well as a difference in 
the level of jihadist activity experienced thus far.  The goal is to analyze the various 
variables and determine if one or a couple of them are more prevalent than the others, 
which could then be used as an analytical tool when evaluating the potential for 
radicalization in other European countries. 
C. PURPOSE 
The driving force behind this project is to understand why the rise of Islamic 
fundamentalism has occurred in some countries within Western Europe, while the 
concept of violent jihad has not taken root within other countries.  The resulting data may 
help to identify possible policy changes to counter Islamic fundamentalism in Europe.  
From the perspective of the United States, understanding why the jihad is resonating with 
different Muslim populations in Europe may assist efforts to combat and prevent future 
terrorist actions.  The concern for Americans regarding the European origin of terrorists 
was highlighted by terrorism analyst, Peter Bergen: “The most pressing threat to 
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Americans from Al Qaeda is not from within, but from without: its cells and affiliated 
groups based in Europe”9.  Based on Bergen’s analysis, it is imperative the United States 
understand the dynamics of Europe’s Muslim populations and some of the possible 
explanations for the differing jihadist dynamics.   
D. JIHAD PARTICIPATION DISPARITY 
What explains the variation among Western European countries in the level of 
participation in jihad?  A number of hypotheses abound which have been incorporated 
into this research.  One is the differing integration policies towards immigrants which 
have been adopted by each of the countries.  These policies range from the British 
attempt at multiculturalism, France’s policy of assimilation, to German and Spanish 
efforts at segregation.  As each country has taken its own unique perspective in 
addressing its immigrant Muslim populations, some policies appear to have allowed for 
complete isolation of the Muslim communities which has led to a lack of national pride 
or identity within the isolated communities.  Other policies have promoted inclusion in 
the country and helped to establish a sense of shared/common identity with many of the 
other citizens within the country.  The feelings of detachment or inclusion can then be 
reflected positively or negatively against the host government and citizens.  The 
ethnic/state background of immigrants is also believed to be a root cause where Muslims 
with links to different countries/groups (i.e., Pakistan and the Middle East) are more 
likely to engage in jihadist actions.  The perception of increased radicalism emanating 
from Muslims of Pakistani or Middle Eastern origins is based on al Qaeda’s fight against 
the West.  Many members within the core of al Qaeda came from countries within the 
Middle East.  Pakistan similarly had provided a launching point for jihadis, to include 
Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, participating in the Soviet-Afghan War during 
the 1980s. Since then Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas have provided 
safe-haven for Taliban and al Qaeda forces fighting against the U.S. led coalition within 
Afghanistan.  A final hypothesis is that the differing foreign policies and actions of each 
of the countries determine the amount of anger and hatred which can be generated against 
                                                 
9 Peter Bergen, “They Will Strike Again,” Los Angeles Times, 12 December 2004. 
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them by al Qaeda and its surrogates.  The United Kingdom, for example, has been a loyal 
supporter of the United States in the Global War on Terrorism, and as a likely result has 
been in the direct crosshairs of numerous successful and planned attacks.  Spain is 
another country whose foreign policy was believed to be at the forefront of jihadist focus.  
The Madrid bombing in 2004 was claimed to be carried out based on Spain’s 
participation within Iraq and was conducted in an effort to influence Spanish elections.  
Finally, Germany and France did not support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and have had 
offered no public endorsement of U.S. actions within the Middle East.  This may help to 
explain why no attacks have been successfully carried out within either country.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is designed to answer the question why jihadist attacks have been 
successful within some countries in Western Europe and why little activity has occurred 
in others.  In order to get at the heart of this question, this thesis is based on a 
comparative method of four case studies: the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany, and 
France.  These countries have been selected based on the fact the United Kingdom and 
Spain have experienced violent jihadist attacks while Germany and France have not.  In 
order to analyze and compare the activities within each of the countries, four broad areas 
have been selected: the status (social, financial, etc.) of Europe’s Muslims, sentiment 
towards jihad by the Muslim populations, al Qaeda’s ability to gain support of European 
Muslims, and counter-terrorism efforts and initiatives by the different governments and 
police agencies.  Studying each of these areas in greater detail will flesh out some of the 
more critical variables for each section.  Once theses variables have been highlighted for 
each section, cross-cueing of the data can be conducted to determine which may provide 
greater weight in predicting whether or not a population is likely to support the jihad.  
From this data, a blueprint can be constructed which can then be used to analyze other 
countries within Europe to assess threat levels and concerns about jihadist activity within 
their borders.  
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II.  JIHAD DEFINED 
In order to understand the likely role of Europe’s radical Muslims, the first issue 
is analyzing the concept of jihad and how it relates to Europe.  There are various 
dimensions that must be explored in order to comprehend the meaning of jihad and to 
then develop a counter for those using it to foment terrorism.  To do so, it is important to 
analyze how different groups have come to define the meaning of jihad.  These groups 
include al Qaeda, Muslims in Europe, and non-Muslims in the West.  As will be 
highlighted within this chapter, the various definitions alone identify the challenges posed 
to condemn actions and counter the rhetoric and propaganda being espoused by radical 
Islamists. 
To frame these differing views of jihad, it is important to first have a basic 
definition of jihad.  Jihad, in its broadest definition, means to struggle; jihad has both 
spiritual and a physical, warfare dimension.  John Esposito, Georgetown University 
Professor of Religion and International Affairs, states: “Jihad as struggle pertains to the 
difficulty and perplexity of living a good life:  struggling against the evil in oneself—to 
be virtuous and moral, making a serious effort to do good works and help reform 
society.”  Because of the complexity of the world, Muslims will continually go back and 
forth between the “lesser jihad (warfare) to the greater jihad (the spiritual struggle).”10  In 
the modern era, groups like Al Qaeda have called for all Muslims to rise up and engage in 
perpetual warfare in defense of the faith; in essence, therefore, it has made the lesser 
jihad a priority for Muslims around the world.  The following section outlines the calls to 
jihad from Al Qaeda; Muslims in Europe and Muslims in the West. 
A.  AL QAEDA AND JIHAD 
Al Qaeda clearly believes in an aggressive jihad against what it portrays as the 
persecuting West.  The best document to highlight this is Osama bin Laden’s 1996 
declaration of war against the West.  Bin Laden takes the framework from the Koran 
                                                 
10 John Esposito, What Everyone Needs to Know About Islam, (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), 117. 
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(highlighted above), and uses it to clearly structure the current situation as he sees it and 
the way forward.  To bin Laden, Muslims have suffered from the aggression and injustice 
imposed by the Jewish/Christian alliance its supporters.  To bin Laden, it is a clear 
conspiracy between the United States and its allies.  This is highlighted by the West’s 
“occupation of the land of the two Holy Places,” referring to US military forces stationed 
in Saudi Arabia.  It is therefore the obligation of all Muslims to lift the iniquity that has 
been imposed on the Ummah by the “Zionist-Crusader alliance.”   
Local regimes fall within the crosshairs as well.  Bin Laden highlights two actions 
by local regimes that eliminated their legitimacy: 
(1) Suspension of the Islamic Shari’ah law and exchanging it with man 
made civil law. The regime entered into a bloody confrontation with the 
truthful Ulama and the righteous youths (we sanctify nobody; Allah 
sanctify Whom He pleaseth).  The inability of the regime to protect the 
country, and allowing the enemy of the Ummah-the American crusader 
forces- to occupy the land for the longest of years.11 
By supporting the infidels, the apostate regimes have effectively stripped 
themselves of any right to be Muslim.  American troops positioned themselves in Saudi 
Arabia in response to Saddam Hussein’s invading Kuwait.  After Saddam’s defeat, 
American troops remained on the holiest land for Islam.  This infuriated the jihadists.  
Therefore, the apostate regimes allied with the West are enemies of Islam as well, thereby 
eliminating any possibility of a peaceful resolution.  It is clear believers must then hit at 
the enemies of Islam.  The question is whether to accomplish this by fighting the near 
enemy, the apostate regimes in the Middle East, or to focus efforts on the far enemy, the 
United States and the West.  Bin Laden answers the question by stating, “After Belief 
(Imaan) there is no more important duty than pushing the American enemy out of the 
holy land.”  This is because the presence of the American military forces in Islamic Gulf 
is the greatest danger threatening Islam.  “To liberate their sanctities is the greatest of 
issues concerning all Muslims; it is the duty of every Muslim in this world.”12 
                                                 
11 Osama Bin Laden, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa,” Newshour with Jim Lehrer, August 1996, 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/terrorism/international/fatwa_1996.html (accessed February 2007). 
12 Bin Laden, “Bin Laden’s Fatwa.” 
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In 1998, bin Laden issued a fatwa, expanding the range of targets.  It was now an 
obligation of Muslims, “to kill the Americans and their allies (emphasis added), 
including civilians and military, (it) is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it 
in any country in which it is possible to do it.”13  Jihadi activity by Muslims was justified 
as self defense.14  Anyone seen as supporting the American-dominated world system was 
now in the cross hairs. 
In April 2004, Osama bin Laden offered to suspend operations against Europe if 
they stopped supporting the American occupation of Iraq and the war on terror.  The offer 
was for reconciliation with Europe if troops were pulled out of Muslim countries within 
three months.15  When nothing changed, the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades, the group who 
claimed responsibility for the Madrid bombings, put all of Europe on warning of further 
attacks in July 2004 for continuing to maintain military personnel in Muslim countries.  
Several European states openly rejected the offer and none accepted it.16 
B.   JIHAD ACCORDING TO EUROPEAN MUSLIMS 
The question is what does this mean to Muslims in Europe.  What is their role in 
this jihad declared by bin Laden?  If European Muslims agree with bin Laden, do they 
travel to the Middle East or Pakistan to fight the infidel there, or does the fight happen in 
Europe?  Or do European Muslims support the jihad by providing key logistical support 
such as financing?  Do only a minority of European Muslims buy into the jihad?  If there 
is a split amongst European Muslims, how does it break down and can this be used by 
European governments to counter terrorism?  By understanding why some support jihad 
and others don’t, a government can develop an effective counterterrorism campaign.   
                                                 
13 Osama bin Laden, “Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” Federation of American Scientists, 23 
February 1998, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm accessed October 2007). 
14 J. T. Caruso, “Terrorist Groups: Al Qaeda International,” Terrorism Research Center, 
http://www.terrorism.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=11 (accessed 
February 2007). 
15 Magdi Abdelhadi, “Tape Plays to European Audience,” BBC News Online, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3628841.stm (accessed September 2007). 
16 BBC News Online, “Al Qaeda Letter Warns Europe,” 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3859587.stm (accessed September 2007). 
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The Madrid and London bombings, as well as the recently failed attacks in Great 
Britain and Germany show Muslims willing to bring the battle to Europe.  How strong is 
this support? 
In Britain, the YouGov organization surveyed Muslims immediately following the 
7/7 transportation bombings in London.  The goal was to determine the level of support 
for jihadi activity amongst British Muslims.  Results showed a definitive split amongst 
the population.  The first question asked was whether Muslims felt the bombing attacks 
were justified or not.  Only 6 percent believed they were justified, with 84 percent stating 
the attacks were on balance not justified or not justified at all.  Asked whether they had 
sympathy for the feelings and motives of the terrorists, 24 percent stated they did while 
71 percent stated they did not.  Of a more general nature, Muslims were asked whether 
they believed a wave of terrorist attacks would be justified.  Again the majority were 
against it, with only 6 percent feeling it would be justified and 73 percent against it.17   
Another poll conducted by The Times and ITV in Britain came up with similar 
results.  Reviewing them shows the great majority of British Muslims do not support 
jihadi activity in Europe (Table 1). 
Table 1.   British Muslims and Support of 7/7 and Suicide Bombings18 
 Agree Disagree
7/7 bombers acted according to the true principles of Islam 6%  87% 
The 7/7 attacks were wrong but the cause of the bombers was right 16%  69% 
Are there any circumstances under which you think that suicide 
bombings can ever be justified in the UK against the following types 
of targets? 
Yes No 
Civilians 7% 89% 
The military 16% 79% 
The Police 10% 86% 
Government buildings/workers 11% 85% 
                                                 
17 YouGov, “YouGov Survey Results,” 15-22 July 2005, 
http://www.yougov.com/archives/pdf/TEL050101030_1.pdf (accessed July 2007). 
18 Populus, “Muslim 7/7 Poll,” 04-05 July 2006, http://www.populus.co.uk/the-times-itv-news-
muslim-77-poll-050706.html (accessed July 2007). 
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Even more telling was the response to the following question in the same poll:  
What would your reaction be if a close member of your family chose to al Qaeda?  Only 
4 percent said they would feel some form of pride or acceptance and 78 percent stated 
they would be angry with their family member.19  These poll results show the great 
majority of British Muslims do not support al Qaeda or believe suicide bombings are 
justified.   
French Muslims have in general shown a disdain for jihad as well.  During the 
head scarf debate in 2004, two French journalists were kidnapped in Iraq.  The 
kidnappers demanded the French government remove the head scarf ban in order to gain 
the journalists release.  French Muslims united against the ban, with even opponents of 
the ban who had organized demonstrations calling for all schoolgirls to respect the new 
law. Muslim leaders went so far as to denounce this foreign interference in the internal 
affairs of France, calling the kidnappers' demands an “odious [form of] blackmail” and 
proclaiming “there will be no blood on my headscarf.”20  Even the riots of 2005 failed to 
bring calls of jihad from French Muslims.  Any demands and statements that did come 
from the rioters centered on economic injustice, claims of racism, and responding to 
comments by then Interior Minister Sarkozy.  But there were no sustained calls for jihad 
or the implementation of Shari’ah, Muslim law, in France.21  It appears that the majority 
of French Muslims prefer the laws of the Republic over implementing Shari’ah law.22 
Muslim leaders in Spain have also stepped forward to fight against jihad in their 
country.  In fact, the Islamic Conference of Spain issued a fatwa that condemned bin 
Laden as an “apostate” and as a “kafir” within Islam in response to the 3/11 train 
bombings.23  Comments such as cleric Mohammed Kamal Mustafa’s that the 3/11 
                                                 
19 Populus, “Muslim 7/7 Poll.”  
20 Jonathan Laurence, “Islam in France: A Contest Between the Wind and the Sun,” New Europe 
Review, November 2004, http://www.brookings.edu/views/articles/fellows/laurence20041115.htm 
(accessed July 2007). 
21 Vikki Valentine, “Economic Despair, Racism Drive French Riots,” National Public Radio, 08 
November 2005, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5004897 (accessed July 2007). 
22 Laurence, “Islam in France: A Contest Between the Wind and the Sun.” 
23 Jim Guirard, “Spanish Muslims' Fatwa of “Jihad Against al Qaeda,” TruSpeak Institute, 13 March 
2005, http://www.freemuslims.org/news/article.php?article=495 (accessed July 2007). 
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terrorists were exploiting Islam to inflict harm on innocent people mirrored those of the 
vast majority of Spain’s Muslims who condemned the attacks.  This was symbolized by 
the Islamic Cultural Center of Madrid, the country's largest mosque, displaying a large 
banner that denounced terrorism and applauded tolerance and also sent memorial wreaths 
that were displayed at the central commemorative festivities held at the Atocha train 
station.  These were very public displays against jihad and suggest that the majority of 
Muslims in Spain do not support violence in the name of the faith.24 
Despite this broad opposition to violent jihad by European Muslims, jihadi 
activity does occur in Europe.  Individuals often attend radical mosques and meet others 
who share their feelings.  These include the London Baker Street mosque; the abu Bakr 
mosque in Madrid; the al-Quds mosque in Hamburg; and the al-Dawah mosque in 
Roubaix, France.  Each mosque has a history of producing jihadists prior to 9/11.25  
These mosques bring in large amounts of worshippers; weed out the less radical, and then 
the extremists begin to meet more clandestinely, often to carry out violent activities.26    
Prison is an effective recruiting station for jihad as well.  For example, Jamal Ahmidan, a 
young non-practicing Muslim Moroccan living in Spain, became radicalized in a Spanish 
prison.  After his release, he then joined the cell that perpetrated the Madrid train 
bombings.27   
Others are bringing jihad to Europe from parts of the Muslim world.  This is 
assisted by such things as the right of British citizens to return to Britain after attending 
madrassas in Pakistan and Afghanistan instead of requiring them to be educated in 
Britain in order to remain in country.28  Perhaps even more important are those who have 
                                                 
24 Geoff Pingree and Lisa Abend, “Spanish Muslims Decry Al Qaeda,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, 14 March 2005, http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0314/p06s01-woeu.html (accessed July 2007). 
25 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2004), 114 and 143. 
26 Daniel Fried, “Islamist Extremism in Europe.” Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee 
on European Affairs, 05 April 2006, 6. 
27 Ibid., 7. 
28 Irwin Stelzer,, “Letter from Londonistan,” The Weekly Standard, Vol. 10 No. 43, 01 August 2005, 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/871kbaxp.asp (accessed February 
2007). 
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returned from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan to their home countries, experienced and 
with credibility.29  Since 9/11, jihadist organizations have been uncovered in Great 
Britain, Italy, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Belgium.30  Various Muslim 
extremist organizations have embedded themselves inside the Diaspora throughout 
Europe and are acquiring support from radical elements.  These extremists remain 
exceedingly difficult to track down and exist in all four of the subject countries and 
include recent immigrants and long-term residents.31  Terrorism expert Rohan Gunaratna 
argues that Europe is particularly attractive because of its freedom of movement and 
active dissent within some segments of the Muslim population.32 
It is clear there are European Muslims who do see jihadi activity as a legitimate 
method to gain the ends they seek, however they are in the great minority.  The key 
questions are why do some support jihad, some not, and can the reason for this difference 
be utilized by European governments to counter terrorism? 
C.   JIHAD IN THE EYES OF THE WEST 
As Muslims have become more prevalent in Europe, tensions have risen.  This 
includes a rise in xenophobia and right wing extremist groups.  In fact, “Almost all 
Western European countries have an increasingly popular anti-Muslim platform in their 
societies,” says Mark LeVine, associate professor of history at the University of 
California, Irvine, and a Middle Eastern history specialist.33   
                                                 
29 Bruce Hoffman, “Combating al Qaeda and the Militant Islamic Threat,” Rand, 16 February 2006, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT255.pdf (accessed February 2007), 12. 
30 Ibid., 72. 
31 Bruce Hoffman, “Islam and the West: Searching for Common Ground,” Rand, 18 July 2006, 
http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2006/RAND_CT263.pdf (accessed February 2007), 7. 
32 Rohan Gunaratna, “The Post Madrid Face of Al-Qaeda,” The Washington Quarterly, Summer 2004, 
http://muse.jhu.edu (accessed February 2007), 95. 
33 Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam,” Council on Foreign Relations, 13 July 2005, 
http://www.cfr.org/publication/8252/europe.html#1 (accessed February 2007). 
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This attitude bears itself out in a Pew Global Attitudes Project report.34  
Europeans were asked if there is a conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in 
a modern society.  Germans, Spanish, and British respondents overwhelmingly stated 
there was a conflict.  The majority of the French, however, believe there isn’t a conflict 
(Table 2).  Is there a reason for the difference of opinion between the French and the 
other countries?  If so, it could help explain the lack of jihadi violence in France 
compared to Spain and Great Britain.  Statistical data and policy decisions will be 
compared in the next chapter to see if there are differences which explain the  poll data. 
 
Table 2.   Conflict between being a devout Muslim and living in a modern society?35 
 No Yes 
Germany 26 70 
Spain 36 58 
France 74 26 
Great Britain 35 54 
 
In the same Pew Report, Europeans were asked which negative characteristics 
they associated with Muslims.  Table 3 shows that a significant portion of the target 
populations associated fanaticism and violence with Muslims.  With this question, 
Germany and Spain took a hard line with France and Great Britain having at least 50 
percent of their population not associating violence and fanaticism with Muslims. 
 
Table 3.   Negative Characteristics Non-Muslims Associated with Muslims36 
 Fanatical Violent 
Germany 78 52 
Spain 83 60 
France 50 41 
Great Britain 48 32 
                                                 
34 Andrew Kohut, “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners And 
Muslims View Each Other,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 
22 June 2006). 
35 Ibid., 3. 
36 Ibid., 6. 
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Pew also asked Europeans how concerned they were about Islamic extremism in 
the world (Table 4).  Interestingly, the Germans and French are the most concerned.  
However, it is clear the majority in all four countries are at least somewhat or very 
concerned about Islamic extremism, wherever it may exist. 
 
Table 4.   How Concerned Are You About Islamic Extremism In The World?37 
 Total Concerned Somewhat Concerned Very Concerned 
Germany 93% 38% 55% 
France 89% 41% 48% 
Great Britain 84% 34% 50% 
Spain 77% 38% 39% 
 
The most direct question in the Pew Report asked to non-Muslim Europeans 
regarding Muslims in their countries was, “How many Muslims in your country support 
Islamic extremists like al Qaeda?”  The Spanish are the most suspicious, with 41 percent 
of Spaniards believing many or most Muslims in their country support Islamic extremist 
organizations.  The other three countries hover at around 20 percent believing Muslims in 
their country aid extremists (Table 5). 
 
Table 5.   Muslims in your country support Islamic extremists like al Qaeda?38 
 Many Involved Most Involved Total 
Germany 26% 15% 41% 
France 14% 6% 20% 
Great Britain 11% 9% 20% 
Spain 14% 4% 18% 
 
The data suggest, therefore, that most non-Muslim citizens in Germany, France, 
Great Britain, and Spain see a natural conflict between being a Muslim and the modern 
world.  It is also evident many Europeans see fanaticism and violence inherent in Islam.   
 
                                                 
37 Kohut, “Europe’s Muslims More Moderate. The Great Divide: How Westerners and Muslims View 
Each Other,” 24. 
38 Ibid., 26. 
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This has led to an almost universal concern about Islamic extremism in general, and for 
some a belief that many Muslims in their countries support extremists.  Jihad is therefore 
a relevant issue to many within our four target countries. 
D. CONCLUSION 
The question that comes out of all this material is whether it is possible to counter 
the desire for jihad that exists within a portion of European Muslims.  Can the apparent 
split within the European Muslim community be used to prevent jihad?  Is it possible to 
use this as leverage in the European Muslim community to counter Islamic extremism?  
As Marc Sageman has noted, mosques are just as likely to constrain activity as they are to 
promote it.39  Can European governments work with their Muslim communities to 
counter terrorism?  Are Europeans willing to work by, with, and through Muslim 
organizations to reach a solution?  These questions will be answered in subsequent 
chapters. 
                                                 
39 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 143. 
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III. STATUS OF EUROPEAN MUSLIMS 
Too often analysis looks at European Muslims as a singular issue--as if it is one 
Europe and the Muslims are all the same.  By looking deeper into the details, some 
unique factors may be identified.  Perhaps there is something about the status of Muslims 
in Europe that can explain the difference in jihadist activity in France, Spain, Germany, 
and Great Britain.  Looking at the Muslim population itself, data can be analyzed 
regarding the national origin of the Muslim population, social status of Muslims, the 
employment and income levels, and the education levels achieved to see if differences 
exist between the countries.  If so, a connection between that difference and varied levels 
of jihadi activity may exist.  Government policy must also be examined to determine if 
differing approaches to the Muslim population may lead to jihadi activity.  The focus of 
this report will be on how each country approaches Muslim issues, civil rights, prison 
statistics, and assimilation and integration policy. 
A. NATIONAL ORIGIN 
It is tempting to just look at European Muslims as a monolith.  However there are 
critical differences involved in the Muslim populations in each country that could explain 
the different levels of activity; one of these is national origin of the majority of Muslims 
in each country.  In France, the great majority of Muslims are North Africans from 
Algeria and Morocco.  It is similar in Spain, with Moroccans the leading Muslim 
population in the country.  For Germany, it is primarily Turkish immigrants.40  The 
populations in these countries tend to be more secular.  This is especially true for the 
Turks, with Turkey’s constitution ensuring, “The Republic of Turkey is a democratic, 
secular and social state governed by the rule of law.”41  Correspondingly, Turkish 
immigrants have not been involved in any jihadi activity that has occurred in Germany.  
In Britain, the Muslim population is primarily Pakistani, Indian, and Bangladeshi, which 
                                                 
40 Daniel Fried, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” 2. 
41 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey, Hellenic Resources Network, 
http://www.hri.org/docs/turkey/part_i.html#article_2 (accessed September 2007). 
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tends to be more religiously centered.42  This is highlighted by the uninhibited right of 
British Muslims to attend radical madrassas in Pakistan for education, and then return to 
Britain.43 
B. SOCIAL STATUS 
Social status may also provide some insight into differences between the 
countries.  Even without 9/11 and jihadi activity, the growth of the European Muslim 
population would have forced governments to begin to deal with the issue.  This is 
largely due to the fact that while European birthrates are stagnating, Muslim birthrates are 
running around three times higher.44  According to projections by the US federal 
government's National Intelligence Council, the continent's current Muslim population of 
20 million will likely double by 2025.45  By 2050, one in five Europeans will likely be 
Muslim.46 
With the ever increasing percentage of European Muslims, the next question to 
ask is whether they are becoming part of the society they live in or remaining distinct 
from it.  It is possible higher levels of perceived integration could explain a lower level of 
jihadi activity in a country.  The Pew Global Attitudes Project polled both Muslims and 




                                                 
42 Daniel Fried, “Islamist Extremism in Europe,” 2. 
43 Irwin M. Stelzer, “Letter from Londonistan.”  
44 O. Taspinar, “Europe’s Muslim Street,” Global Politics (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 
March 2003) http://www.brookings.edu/views/op-ed/fellows/taspinar20030301.htm (accessed February 
2007). 
45 Steven Simon, “Guess Who’s Coming to Europe?” Washington Post, 26 March 2006, 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/03/23/AR2006032301464.html (accessed 
February 2007). 
46 Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam.”  
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Muslims were asked whether they consider themselves a citizen of their country 
or a Muslim first.  Interestingly French Muslims are almost evenly split, while the other 
three countries have Muslim populations that overwhelmingly believe they are Muslim 
first (Figure 1).47  Is there something the French are doing differently from the other three 
countries to account for the difference? 
Figure 1.   Nation Vs. Religion48 
 
 
A similar question was asked of the native population in each country.  The same 
Pew poll asked whether natives believed Muslims in their country most wanted to be 
distinct from society or adopt national customs.  Again France came in at a near split, 
with the other three countries overwhelmingly stating that the Muslims wanted to stay 
distinct from society (Figure 2).49  This is further evidence the French are doing 
something different from the other countries.  The French Muslim sense of being further 
integrated than their fellow Muslims in Germany, Spain, and Great Britain is a possible 
explanation for a lower level of jihadi activity in France. 
                                                 
47 Jodie Allen, “Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans,” The Pew Global Attitudes Project 
(Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 06 July 2006), http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/254.pdf 
(accessed February 2007), 3. 
48 Ibid., 3. 
49 Ibid., 8. 
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C. EMPLOYMENT AND INCOME 
Employment rates and income levels for Muslims in Europe come in lower than 
the native populations across Europe.  The question again is whether there is some 
difference in the statistics to explain the different activity levels. 
Muslim unemployment is above the national average in all four countries.  Turks 
in Germany have consistently had the lowest employment rate of any nationality, running 
over 20 percent from the late 1990s through 2001.51  France has similar results, with 
areas outside of Paris loaded with Muslims dealing with a 17 percent unemployment rate, 
nearly twice as high as the 9.4 percent national rate.52  In Britain, 17 percent of Muslims 
have never worked nor are currently long-term unemployed, compared to 3 percent for 
                                                 
50 Allen, “Few Signs of Backlash from Western Europeans,” 8. 
51 Gisela Will and Stefan Ruehl, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany,” 
European Forum for Migration Studies, Bamberg, Germany, 2004, 87. 
52 Esther Pan, “Europe: Integrating Islam.” 
 21
the overall population.53  Unfortunately, data for the unemployment rates of Spanish 
Muslims was not available.  However the report clearly states Muslims in Spain do in fact 
have a higher unemployment rate than the national average.54  As employment rates are 
similar, it appears there is no link between this statistic and the different activity levels. 
Looking a little deeper, income levels may provide a little more insight.  The 
standard is to say that Muslim incomes are significantly lower than the general public and 
place that as a problem across the board.  However looking at the statistics in a little 
detail will show there is a difference between each of the countries.  French Muslims 
enjoy the highest income levels of the four groups.  Twenty percent of French Muslims 
have an income of €29,500 or more, compared to 7 percent in Spain, 12 percent in 
Germany, and 13 percent in Great Britain.  This trend continues down to the lowest 
income levels, with only Germany coming close to the Muslim income levels in France 
(Table 6).55  Therefore, decidedly higher income levels for French Muslims when 








                                                 
53 Zamila Bunglawala, “Aspirations and Reality: British Muslims and the Labour Market,” (Budapest, 
Hungary: Open Society Institute, 2004) 
http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/eumapmuslims_20040722/british_musli
ms.pdf (accessed September 2007), 8. 
54 Movement for Peace, Disarmament, and Liberty, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal 
Point for Spain,” Madrid, 2004, 34. 
55 Andrew Kohut, “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream,” The Pew Global 
Attitudes Project (Washington, D.C.: PEW Research Center, 22 May 2007), 
http://info.detnews.com/2007/muslimamericans.pdf (accessed October 2007), 3. 
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Table 6.   Income Levels56 
    Muslims 
General 
Public Difference 
France      
 €29,500 or more  20 32 -12 
 €17,500-€29,499  35 41 -6 
 Less than €17,500 45 27 18 
Spain      
 €21,500 or more  7 26 -19 
 €14,500-€21,499  20 24 -4 
 Less than €14,500 73 50 23 
Germany      
 €30,000 or more  12 26 -14 
 €18,000-€29,999  35 39 -4 
 Less than €18,000 53 35 18 
Britain      
 ₤40,000 or more  13 23 -10 
  ₤20,000-₤39,999  26 38 -12 
  Less than ₤20,000 61 39 22 
 
D. EDUCATION 
Education also provides some potential insight into the different activity levels.  
However it may be the approach that is taken that leads to a difference as opposed to the 
statistical data regarding educational achievement that determines whether Muslims 
resort to jihadi activity or not. 
In all four countries, what primary school an individual goes to is based on where 
they live.  What is occurring is similar to the pre-integration days of the United States.  In 
France, urban segregation has resulted in school segregation, with Muslims primarily 
                                                 
56 Andrew Kohut, “Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream.” 
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only going to school with other Muslims.57  The same is also true in Spain58 and Great 
Britain59 as well.  Though no nation-wide effort has been conducted in Germany, it is 
clear segregation exists there as well.60 
In general, the European Union noted low performance by Muslim students across 
all four countries.  In Spain, students of North African decent consistently rank lower 
than natives.61  In Germany, when Turks do continue education they end up primarily in 
the lower vocational school types.62  In Great Britain, the “groups most at risk of 
underachieving are Bangladeshi and Pakistani” students.63  In France, it is immigrants 
from Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia that present the greatest concern.64 
A difference that does appear in education is the approach each country takes.  
France is the only one that pushes a singular philosophy across the entire education 
system; the emphasis is on the broad republican principle of universal, equal, secular, and 
compulsory education.65  In France, the desire is to promote national unity and secularity 
through education in order for the individual to assimilate into secular society as a fully 
functioning citizen.66  This push to assimilate helps individuals become a part of the 
French society, as opposed to seeking to destroy it.  None of the other three countries take 
this approach, often leading disgruntled Muslims with no choice other than jihad to 
rectify their situation. 
                                                 
57 Dr. Vije Franchi, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for France,” (Paris: Agency 
for the Development of Intercultural Relations, 2004), 41-2. 
58 Will and Ruehl, “Analytical Report on Education National Focal Point for Germany,” 34. 
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65 Ibid., 3. 
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E. GOVERNMENTAL PARTICIPATION 
The clearest picture on how each government approaches the Muslim issue was 
provided by the Analytical Report on Education completed for all four countries.  The 
contrast is whether to deal with the issue from the national level or leave to regional and 
local governments to develop their own solutions.  In Britain, policy is primarily handled 
by the regional governments of England, Scotland, and Wales.67  Spain is similar with its 
regional governments taking the lead on initiatives.68  In Germany, responsibility falls to 
the numerous federal and city states.69  France is the exception.  France’s approach is to 
attack issues from the national level.  This is clearly based on the republican principles at 
the core of the French system.  The goal of French policy is to create Frenchmen, where 
the other countries appear to be primarily trying to resolve the specific issues at hand 
based on regional requirements.70  This difference in approach could explain why more 
French Muslims identify with the country than the other three countries. 
F. PRISON STATISTICS 
Prison has been highlighted as a haven for Islamic extremism and essentially as a 
recruiting station for jihadists.  The general belief is by placing too many Muslims in 
prison, a country actually increases animosity and encourages individuals to radicalize.  
However the results appear to be counterintuitive as the French are much more likely to 
imprison a Muslim than Britain or Spain. 
In Great Britain, Muslims currently make up around eight percent of the prison 
population; an estimated two to four times their percentage of the overall population.71  
Spain is almost identical, with the Muslim population hovering around 2.3 percent of the 
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overall population72 and the percentage of prisoners being Muslim at 10 percent.73  Our 
research was unable to uncover any data on the percentage of Muslim prisoners in 
German jails. 
France is a different story.  The percentage of Muslims in France runs around 
seven percent.74  Estimates for the percentage of French prisoners being Muslim run up 
70 percent.75  Are Great Britain and Spain being too lenient with their Muslim population 
and extremists?  Perhaps the French secular and republican approach, where religion and 
ethnicity are irrelevant, is the most effective method for countering Islamic extremism. 
G. ASSIMILATION, MULTICULTURALISM, & GUEST WORKER 
A common mistake made by analysts is to assume Muslims as a whole simply 
don’t assimilate into other cultures.  The numbers above disagree, showing close to half 
of Muslims in France placing being French over being a Muslim.  What explains the 
different results achieved by France from the other three surveyed countries?  What can 
explain 81 percent of British Muslims identifying themselves as Muslim rather than 
British…or 69 percent in Spain or 66 percent in Germany doing the same, while only 46 
percent of French Muslims identify themselves as Muslim first?76  A possible 
explanation is the different approaches of assimilation, integration, and multiculturalism. 
Many Europeans have traditionally viewed Muslims as guest workers in their 
countries who would eventually go “home.” This leads to Europeans viewing Muslims as 
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“foreign,” despite many having been born in Europe.77  This was the policy pursued by 
Germany and Spain, essentially hoping the problem would eventually go away.  Britain 
preferred a policy of multiculturalism, essentially trying to keep everybody 
separate…Brits stay Brits and Muslims stay Muslims.  Of the four countries, only France 
has attempted a policy of assimilation.  The goal was to create Frenchmen out of their 
immigrants.78 
Has this different approach been 100 percent successful?  No, but the statistics 
show the French are doing better than the other three countries.  A Pew Research poll 
asked Muslims in each country whether they wanted to adopt the customs of that country.  
In France, nearly 80 percent said yes.  In contrast, 53 percent said yes in Spain, 41 
percent said yes in Great Britain, and only 30 percent said yes in Germany.  These results 
are especially interesting when you consider the Muslim populations of France and Spain 
both overwhelmingly come from North Africa.79  Therefore it would appear it is policy 
that is a prime driving factor in successfully winning over Muslims to the country they 
live in. 
H. CONCLUSION 
By analyzing empirical data regarding Muslims in each country, one can draw 
distinctions.  It is clear each country has a particular country their Muslim population 
came from.  Realizing this allows one to then analyze the particulars of each population, 
such as the increased religiosity of Pakistanis in Great Britain when compared to the 
more secular Turks in Germany.  Perceived social status, as well as employment, income, 
and education statistics also highlight distinctions between the Muslim populations in 
Europe.  Each area shows French Muslims experiencing greater integration into society 
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when compared to their counterparts in the other countries.  This is logical as France is 
the only country of the four that attempted an assimilation policy with its immigrants, as 
opposed to the multicultural and guest worker approach of the others.  The end result is 
French Muslims existing within society and seeking to resolve issues within the 
structures of said society; the other three have Muslim populations external to society that 
have often have no choice but to try to resolve issues outside established structures, 
making them more vulnerable to join the jihad. 
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IV. SENTIMENT TOWARDS JIHAD 
In order for global jihad to resonate within a population, a number of driving 
forces must be aligned for success.  These forces can be broken down into two broad 
categories: factors internal to individual Muslims (national origin and religiosity) and the 
Muslim communities at large (recruitment and counter radicals).  Measuring the presence 
or absence of these areas within a Muslim population may help to understand the likely 
sentiment the people may have towards jihad.  This may then flesh out which groups are 
more apt to support the jihad elsewhere in the world, which ones may be more inclined to 
carry out or support attacks within their European countries, and which ones have no 
desire to support any notion of the global jihad.  This chapter will analyze the potential 
driving forces of jihadist sentiment.  
The first step in analyzing the possible sentiment must be to determine whether 
rhetoric and actions within a country are motivated by the desire to support the global 
jihad or if they in fact represent disenfranchised anger.  The two transportation bombings 
within London in 2005 and the 2004 Madrid train bombings highlight attacks which were 
inspired by the ideology espoused by al Qaeda for a global jihad.  Investigations into each 
of these attacks reveal radical Muslims operating within the United Kingdom and Spain 
which carried out the attacks in an effort to communicate their frustration and anger with 
the foreign policies of each country.80,81  On the other hand, the November 2005 civil 
unrest witnessed in France “had little to do with yearnings for a worldwide caliphate and 
much to do with domestic socioeconomic problems.”82  The initial distinction between 
jihad and disenfranchised anger is critical in the analytical process.  If it is made 
incorrectly, the resulting data and analysis will likely be inaccurate.  
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Terrorism analyst Marc Sageman in his book Understanding Terror Networks, 
highlighted some of the key characteristics of nearly two hundred al Qaeda members.  
Some of his analysis has provided a broad stroke of elements which may help understand 
sentiment towards jihad.  According to Sageman, 73% of the members were married with 
many having children as well, 80% were in some way isolated from the society with 
which they lived in, and 68% had pre-existing links to individuals already in the jihad or 
were part of a group which collectively joined together.83  The analysis in this chapter 
will build upon some of these variables to better understand the sentiment adopted or 
rejected by various Muslim groups within Europe. 
A. INTERNAL FACTORS 
There are numerous components which make up individual Muslims as well as 
the groups which they associate with; however, a couple of key factors which came to the 
forefront of the analysis are the national origins and religiosity of Muslims residing 
within Europe.  Culture and ethnicity of the various groups also are critical factors in the 
sentiment towards jihad, but would require significant analysis.  Studying cultural and 
ethnic factors of the Muslim populations in the target countries can in and of itself be an 
individual thesis.  As a result, these two areas have been incorporated with national origin 
to help identify the broad identity and differences between individuals from differing 
ancestral backgrounds.  
1. National Origin 
From the perspective of national origin, the first thing to analyze is the make-up 
of the Muslim populations in each of the four countries and to then tie this data to the 
levels of jihadist activity within each country.  The underlying goal is to correlate a 
proclivity for action to Muslims from different ancestral backgrounds.  Although this 
process may oversimplify all of the variables at play as well as fail to provide a definitive 
predictor of likely jihadist sentiment, it can help to offer a component to the overall 
analysis of a target group.   
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Looking first to the United Kingdom, according to the UK’s 2001 Census, there 
were 1.6 million Muslims legally residing within the UK.  Of those the majority came 
from Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India.  Smaller concentrations of Muslims also 
immigrated from the Middle East and Northern Africa (Table 7).84  Although jihadist 
sentiment is likely to only resonate amongst a small portion of the population, parallels 
have been drawn between jihadist action and links to Pakistan and the al Qaeda core.  
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy issued Policy Watch #1256 in July 2007.  
Within the report it was identified that “British citizens of Pakistani origin have 
predominated in al-Qaeda linked plots.”85  Although attacks and planning have 
predominantly occurred from within the Pakistani community in the UK, Muslims with 
other origins have also been identified as active participants in the global jihad.  In July 
2005, British police arrested an Ethiopian terrorist cell which was planning multiple 
suicide bombing attacks against soft targets within London.  Additionally, some of the 
members within this cell were also linked to individuals involved in the July 21, 2005 
London bombings.86   
Jihadist activity in the UK, including attacks as well as foiled plots, has been the 
most numerous of all four of the countries in this study.  In November 2006, Dame Eliza 
Manningham-Buller, the head of the British domestic security service (MI5), cautioned 
that there were more than 200 known terror networks comprised of 1,600 individuals 
within the UK, and it was believed that 30 terror plots were underway.87  Can this large 
number be associated with the national origin of the Muslim populations?  Once again, 
although numerous factors account for this activity, there is a high likelihood that part of 
the connection is based on national origin.  According to Marc Sageman, al Qaeda’s 
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recruits usually had to have a link to the jihad to successfully integrate into the network.88  
Although the internet is believed to help alleviate the necessary familial or friendship ties 
to jihad, it still does not allow individuals to train and adequately prepare for attacks.  As 
a result, trusted relationships appear to be relied upon in order to plan and carry out 
jihadist actions.  The August 2006 UK liquid bomb plot provides an example of many of 
the attacks and plots conducted targeting citizens of the UK.  As a result of the arrests 
related to this plot, more than 24 people were taken into custody.  Some of these 
individuals were believed to have had connections back to Pakistan.  In addition Pakistani 
authorities arrested seven individuals in Pakistan believed to be involved in the plot.89  
Connections back to Pakistan have not been fleshed out to highlight specifically why 
these links are so vital to jihadist activity within the UK, but what can be deduced is that 
Muslims in the UK of Pakistani origin maintain direct ties back to their ancestral 
homeland.  Whether they become radicalized upon visits to Pakistan or they become 
radical within the UK and then reaffirm their devotion to the jihadist ideology during 
travel to Pakistan is not known.  What is known is that Pakistan’s Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas are believed to be providing safe haven to Osama bin Laden, Ayman al 
Zawahiri, and a number of key al Qaeda and Taliban members.  In addition, when 
mujahideen fighters traveled to fight the Soviets within Afghanistan, many of them 
traveled by way of Pakistan.  It was in Pakistan where Ayman al Zawahiri and Osama bin 
Laden began to establish the roots of al Qaeda.90  These elements have led to a large pro-
jihadist movement in Pakistan and with its influence upon Pakistani Muslims in the UK, 
may help to explain why the UK is the most targeted European country.  
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Table 7.   Muslims in the UK91 
Muslims in the UK: 1.6 million 




Middle East/Africa 350,000 
* All numbers approximate 
 
Spain’s Muslim population is estimated at around 600,000 legal immigrants, and 
it is unique in that it is varied and made up of Muslims from a variety of countries within 
Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.  According to a 2001 Census, the 
preponderance of Muslims originated from Morocco (approximately 21% of legal 
immigrants) followed by concentrations of Muslims from Algeria, Senegal, and Pakistan 
(Table 8).92  Given Spain’s geographic proximity to Northern Africa and relatively easy 
access from Morocco via the Straits of Gibraltar, there is believed to be a large number of 
illegal Muslim immigrants residing within Spain as well.  Some organizations have 
estimated upwards of 200,000 illegal immigrants living within Spain.93  As is the case 
with most Islamic radical groups, the number of these immigrants (legal and illegal) 
believed to be involved in radical Islamic actions is extremely low in comparison with the 
total Muslim population.  According to an advisor to Spain’s Interior Minister, estimates 
of radical Islamists were as high as 1,000 in July 2005.94  Given these numbers, however, 
the only major terrorist attacks which have come to the forefront within Spain are the 
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Madrid train bombings in March 2004 and a thwarted plot to bomb Spain’s High Court in 
2004.  Utilizing Sageman’s link theory approach, it would make sense that little activity 
has occurred within Spain.95  This is based on the fact that links back to the primary 
organization, al Qaeda, are not as well defined given the smaller concentrations of Arab 
and Pakistani Muslims residing within Spain.  Some of the individuals involved within 
the Madrid train bombing are believed to have originated from Morocco, Tunisia, and 
Algeria and were believed to have had ties with a number of terrorist organizations 
including al Qaeda, Salafiya Jihadija, and the Algerian Islamic Group.96  So a larger 
emphasis should be placed on individuals with direct links to al Qaeda rather than the 
possibility that the idea of the global jihad might resonate with a group of individuals 
willing to unite and carry out attacks against the local population.  What has been 
witnessed within the region is a growing number of attacks in Northern Africa following 
the merger of Al-Qaeda and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (now referred 
to as Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)).  Given this increase in terrorist attacks, 
Spanish officials are convinced that Islamist terrorism is the greatest threat to the country.  
In April 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri called for Spain to become part of a Pan-Islamic 
Caliphate, but given the small of amount of activity as well as the lack of direct links 
between al Qaeda and the North African Muslim population, it appears that this concept 





                                                 
95 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks.  
96 Jose Rodriguez, “The March 11th Terrorist Network: In its weakness Lies in its Strength,” 
(Barcelona, Spain: University of Barcelona, Department of Sociology, December 2005), 
http://www.ub.es/epp/wp/11m.PDF (accessed October 2007), 7. 
97 John Daly, “Spain Alarmed by Recent Terrorist Attacks in North Africa,” Terrorism Focus, Volume 
4, Issue 11, 24 April 2007, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373345 (accessed 
October 2007). 
 35
Table 8.   Muslims in Spain98 
Muslims in Spain: 600,000 
National Origins 




36 other Middle East, SE Asian, 
and African countries 
* All numbers approximate 
** Countries listed in numerical order of total immigrants 
 
Germany has approximately 3.3 million Muslims (3.5% of the total population) 
living within the country of which over two million (70% of Muslim population) 
originated from Turkey. The next highest concentrations of Muslims are from Bosnia and 
Iran, with a small mix of Muslims coming from various Middle Eastern and North 
African countries (Table 9).99  The large Turkish population and secular nature of Turkey 
coincides with the small levels of uncovered plots which have occurred within Germany.  
The lack of radical Islam within the Turkish population was emphasized in an 
International Crisis Group report: “Much of the Turkish minority is influenced – to an 
extent which divides it from Europe’s North African and South Asian Muslim 
populations – by the modernist Kemalist tradition, which subordinates Islam to the 
modernist-nationalist interests of the state.”100  The small level of activity was 
highlighted by German authorities in July 2005 when they identified that 300 suspects 
(less than 1% of the population), thought to have links with international terrorism, were 
placed under surveillance.101  Additionally, no attacks have occurred within Germany 
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and the small handful of plots which have been uncovered were planned by “either 
German converts or dual nationals of Arab, not Turkish origin.”102  They also appear to 
have been targeting U.S. interests more so than German ones.  A recent example is the 
arrests in September 2007 related to a plot to detonate bombs targeting American citizens 
near U.S. military bases and airports in Germany.103  Furthermore, the activity which 
appears to have been coming from Germany is more along the lines of radical 
sympathizers (financing and recruiting) instead of individuals ready to carry out attacks 
in Germany.  According to a Terrorism Monitor report, “[t]he few jihadi suspects 
apprehended so far are of Arab origin or were German converts.”104  These examples 
lend credence to the need for established links with radical Islamists which likely are 
based on national origin.     
Table 9.   Muslims in Germany105 
Muslims in Germany: 3 million 
National Origin Number 







Other countries 170,000 
* All numbers approximate 
                                                 
102 International Crisis Group, “Islam and Identity in Germany,” 12. 
103 Christian Retzlaff and Sebastian Rotella, “Plot to Kill GIs Tourists Alleged; Germany Arrests 
Three Suspects it Says Had Ties to an Al Qaeda Ally,” Los Angeles Times, 06 September 2007, A1. 
104 Anouar Boukhars, “The Threat of Islamist Terrorism to Germany,” Terrorism Monitor, Volume 5, 
Issue 7, 12 April 2007, http://jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2373324 (accessed 
October 2007), 1. 
105 Karasik and Benard, “Muslim Diasporas and Networks,” 483. 
 37
France, with the largest number of Muslims within Europe, is home to an 
estimated 5-6 million Muslims.  Since France does not collect statistics on the racial, 
ethnic, or religious backgrounds of its population, the total number is not precise, but it is 
an estimation by a range of analysts.  The vast majority of French Muslims originated 
from Algeria and Morocco.  France is also home to smaller groups of Muslims from the 
Middle East and North Africa—primarily reflecting past French colonial interests.106  
Although the French government has had struggles with its immigrant community in the 
past, it appears that the problems have been based on social, economic issues rather than 
the support of radical Islamic ideas.  With the majority of Muslims originating from 
Algeria; the recent merger of the Algerian terrorist organization, GSPC (now AQIM) and 
al Qaeda; as well as jihadist comments directed against the French by Ayman al-
Zawahiri, it would seem that France could be more susceptible to a terror attack from 
within; however, to date their has been little indication that the messages propagated by 
al Qaeda will take root within France.  Although there are likely a number of factors why 
this has occurred, it must be noted that the national origin of France’s Muslim population 
must be considered.  To begin with, when applying Sageman’s link theory to the Muslim 
population, the fact there is little connection back to the roots of al Qaeda (i.e., Pakistanis, 
Arabs, or hard core representatives trained in al Qaeda terrorist training camps), helps to 
identify the likely reason behind so little activity and resonance of the radical ideology.  
In addition, since AQIM’s merger with al Qaeda did not occur as a means of physical 
interaction between the two organizations, it appears their ability to influence the 
immigrant Algerian population within France was diminished.  As has been the case with 
other pockets of terrorists within Europe, most took root based on some form of physical 
interaction between the hard core radicals and the groups adopting the ideology.  In the 
case of AQIM, the organization pledged allegiance to bin Laden and al Qaeda but there 
has been no reported exchange of fighters, physical terrorist training, or the experiences 
of the Afghanistan jihad to create the common link for the organizations to truly 
exchange the ideology and buy into the goals of one another.      
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Table 10.   Muslims in France107 
Muslims in France: 5-6 million 
National Origin 
Algeria & other North African countries 
Various Arab countries 
Non-Arab countries; including Turkey 
Asia; including Pakistan & Indonesia 
Others 
2. Religiosity 
The second internal factor of Europe’s Muslims being analyzed in this thesis is 
the religiosity of the Muslim populations of each country.  Religiosity as defined by 
Dictionary.com refers to “the quality of being religious; piety; devoutness.”108  The 
purpose of looking at this factor is to determine if some Muslim populations view 
themselves as more religious, and as a result are more likely to buy into the more hard 
core Islamist concepts espoused by radicals.  Table 11 was taken from a 2006 Pew 
research project to measure some of the pertinent issues to the Muslim communities of 
the four European countries in this study.  As can be seen from this data, and which will 
be discussed in greater detail in the following paragraphs, with the exception of Spain 
there appears to be a link between the religiosity of the population and the country’s level 
of jihadist activity. 
Looking first at the UK, it is easy to draw from the data that the Muslim 
population is far more concerned with religious issues than any of the other three 
countries, and as a result this draws the link between the significantly higher amounts of 
jihadist activity taking place there.  This is evident in the significantly higher percentage 
of respondents concerned about the decline of religion as well as the influence of pop 
culture (Table 11). Also of note, ICM Research Company conducted a poll of Muslims 
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within the UK in November 2004.  One of the questions identified how often the 
respondents conducted prayer.  Since Salah (prayer) is the second pillar of Islam and the 
requirement is to pray five times a day, measuring the population’s loyalty to this pillar 
can help to draw attention to the religiosity of the population.  The poll data revealed that 
51% polled followed the second pillar of Islam to the fullest in praying five times a day.  
Additionally, 76% prayed at least once a day.109  Although the additional 25% did not 
completely follow the second pillar of Islam, given the fact they prayed at least once a 
day, highlights a population which does regard Islam as an important element within their 
daily lives.  
Spain is the one country with data which does not fit the religiosity model.  
According to the poll data in Table 11, Spanish Muslims are the least concerned about 
extremism, decline of the religion, and the influence of pop culture.  This could be 
explained by the fact that of the four countries, Spain is the least Westernized, and until 
recently, the government had made little effort in regulating religious locations and 
actions.  Since the Spanish government elected to maintain greater secularism within 
Spanish institutions, the support of religious groups and organizations have also been 
impacted.  As a result, the government does not provide funding for mosques or places of 
worship.  In order to establish these religious locations, the Muslim communities have 
turned to foreign countries to provide assistance for funding and religious experts, or they 
have created informal, unmarked prayer rooms, which experts have referred to as 
hundreds of “garage mosques.”110  Because of the autonomy granted to the religious 
establishments by the Spanish government, it is likely the Muslim population does not 
feel concerned about western issues and a loss of religious values, as depicted within the 
survey data.         
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Assessing the responses from the German Muslim population, Table 11 highlights 
a population which is not as concerned about westernization and declining religious 
values.  Based on the secular values and nature of the predominant Turkish and Yugoslav 
Muslim populations, this data seems to accurately represent the feelings of the country.  
According to a Congressional Research report, “the majority of Muslims living in 
Germany have been seen as religious moderates.  Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims have 
traditionally not been drawn to radical forms of Islam.  Only a small percentage even 
belong to formal religious organizations.”111  Once again, the small number of Muslims 
even identifying with a formal religious organization may be a factor in explaining why 
there appears to be much less radical pockets of jihadist thought and a population which 
does not have sentiment towards the jihad. 
The French responses to the Pew poll, although slightly higher than Germany and 
Spain, maintain the theory that the more entrenched within Islam a population considers 
itself, the more likely a higher percentage of the group will be drawn to the jihadist 
ideology.  Table 11 illustrates French Muslims are also less concerned about a declining 
religion and the influence of western values into religion.  The smaller percentage of 
Muslims concerned about these issues is also reflected in two studies bringing to light the 
formal religious practices of French Muslims.  According to the surveys an estimated 
10% of the French Muslim population attends mosque on a regular basis.112  
Additionally, “[a]pproximately 35% consider themselves to be “practicing” the faith of 
Islam.”113  Both of these statistics reflect a large portion of the Muslim population which 
does not hold to strict Muslim traditions and as a result is less likely to be influenced by 
radical ideas and actions.  By overlaying this data with jihadist activity within France, it 
is understandable why there appears to be far less sentiment towards the jihad in 
comparison to the other countries in this research.   
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Table 11.   Religion vs. Western Values114 
Muslims Concerns in: 
 UK France Germany Spain 
% very worried about % % % % 
Unemployment 46 52 56 55 
Islamic extremism 44 30 23 22 
Decline of religion 45 21 18 18 
Influence of pop culture 44 17 18 17 
Modern roles for women 22 16 9 10 
 
B. MUSLIM COMMUNITIES AT LARGE 
Within the various European countries, activities take place within each Muslim 
community which may lead to greater or lesser sentiment towards the concept of jihad.  
Obviously if there is a greater likelihood for sentiment, then it naturally follows that there 
is an increased likelihood individuals or groups of individuals will attempt to carry out 
jihadist actions within the country.  A couple of the primary activities which may 
determine the level of sentiment within the population include the ability of radicals to 
recruit and the ability of a counter radical message to thwart the spread of jihadist thought 
and doctrine.   
1. Recruitment 
Due to the freedoms and civil liberties established within the West, the ability to 
spread radical ideology is immense.  Obviously one must be selective in the audiences 
they target, but when these messages are tied to a religious connotation and within a 
community which feels outcast from society, the number of potential recruits can be 
significant.  French scholar, Olivier Roy, discusses these concerns at great length in his 
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book Globalized Islam; The Search for a New Ummah.  Roy points to a youthful, 
minority class within Europe which has been deculturized, and which radicals have 
targeted to establish an Islamic revival or “re-Islamization” in order to construct a 
universal religious identity.115  In order for Muslims to radicalize, there must be a voice 
or image which inspires them to carry out or support radical actions.  There are numerous 
places where this inspiration can be drawn, but the two primary methods have stemmed 
within mosques and prisons. 
a. Mosques 
Many Muslims turn to their local mosques for religious identity as well as 
places of refuge.  In turn they are surrounded by like-minded individuals, many of which 
are frustrated with alienation by the non-Muslim secular society.  This creates a potential 
breeding ground for disenchanted Muslims to voice their anger, unite against their 
perceived enemy, and in some instances, to plot and carry out attacks.  As a result, social 
networks can be created surrounding an extremist ideology which then helps to reinforce 
opinions and make their commitment to radicalization even stronger.  Also of concern, 
much of the funding for the construction and maintenance of Europe’s mosques and 
imams originates in Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries, like Libya.  
Counter terrorism experts have identified that some of the foreign imams tend to preach 
more radical, extremist sermons opposing the European societies vice messages focused 
on assimilation.116  This was evident with Abu Hamza al-Masri, a radical Egyptian cleric 
appointed as the imam of London’s Finsbury Mosque (partially financed by Saudi 
Arabia) in 1996.  Based on al-Masri’s preaching of racial hatred and encouraging murder, 
he is now serving a seven year prison sentence.117    
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Figure 3.   Primary Radical Mosques in Europe: Pre-9/11118 
Applying the generic concerns of mosques as potential recruitment centers 
to more specific cases within the four countries in this study yields interesting results.  As 
will be discussed in greater detail, all countries have taken steps to minimize the ability of 
mosques to influence sentiment towards jihad and serve as recruitment centers; however, 
some countries have been much more proactive and as a result appear to have received 
the benefits of their efforts.  Also of note, some countries have monitored activity for a 
longer period of time than others and once again, this appears to have led to an improved 
apparatus to weed out radical elements and deal with them effectively. 
Of the four countries in this study, the United Kingdom has been the 
slowest to take actions against mosques and imams believed to be spreading radical 
sentiment; however, the UK has taken progressive steps recently as in May 2007 when it 
deported Abdullah el-Faisal an Islamic cleric believed to have influenced the July 7, 2005 
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bombers.119  Because the UK traditionally held to liberal asylum policies and 
immigration laws, a number of radical Muslim clerics and Middle Eastern dissidents 
escaped prosecution from abroad by claiming asylum within the UK.  A primary example 
of this is Abu Hamza al-Masri who was an Egyptian citizen and was able to acquire 
British citizenship.  He served as a former imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque in London, 
and because of his sermons for soliciting murder and inciting racial hatred, he is now 
serving a seven year prison sentence.120  In conjunction with lax asylum laws, the UK 
government and policing services allowed foreign imams to preach in the mosques 
without concern for their language, cultural divide, and anti-Western sentiment.  It wasn’t 
until 2004 when the British government finally began to place a greater emphasis on 
vetting the imams which were active within the UK.  At that time laws were passed 
which called for a basic demonstration of the English language.  Additionally efforts have 
been pushed calling for an understanding of British culture and society.121  British 
officials are also now attempting to establish programs which produce homegrown 
imams who can provide to the needs of the Muslim community but also take into account 
the cultural and societal differences within the country they live.  Finally, plans have also 
been discussed to ease the ability to deport individuals based on advocating violence and 
inciting hatred.122  Although these efforts may produce results in the future, many experts 
have complained these were long overdue changes to Britain’s asylum laws and the 
Muslim community’s autonomy.        
Although Spain reportedly has not been impacted as greatly by radical 
activities and recruitment within the mosques as the UK, it is difficult to fully measure 
the potential influence which may have occurred.  The problem stems from two areas: (1) 
the government’s inability to identify and subsequently monitor the various mosques and 
informal prayer rooms, and (2) the inability of the security services to maintain order 
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within some of the disadvantaged areas of the country.  Because the Spanish government 
has attempted to maintain a policy of secularism in Spanish institutions, it has not been 
involved in the funding or establishment of legitimate mosques.  The result has been a 
series of “garage mosques” which have been created and which are run by imams whose 
qualifications and ideologies are unknown.  In 2004, the Spanish government attempted 
to create laws requiring informal mosques to register, but this was met with great 
resistance from the Muslim leadership and the plans were then abandoned.  To compound 
matters, a number of the mosques were funded by countries like Libya and Saudi Arabia 
whose desired end state is likely much different than that of Spain.123  Another concern 
about spreading sentiment through the mosques is that Spanish police have had difficulty 
in maintaining order in some of the more destitute areas where it is believed grassroots 
jihadi networks can form.  One such group was created in the Spanish city of Cueta.   
The group’s origins stem from meetings in a small mosque called 
Darkawaia that was dominated by a radical imam . . . At the time of the 
raids, the area was practically considered a conflict zone by local police 
and residents . . . In the months preceding the December 12 operation, the 
local police had resigned from patrolling the neighborhood due to various 
threats.124        
With the combination of unregulated mosques and poor policing, it is clear 
Spain had a positive environment for radical recruitment through mosques and will most 
likely continue to be problematic over time. 
Until 9/11 Germany had made many of the same mistakes as the other 
European countries: asylum laws were extremely liberal, Muslim religious leaders were 
imported from other countries (many did not speak the language and held hostile views of 
the West), and privacy protections/freedom of religious expression prevented monitoring 
of activities within the mosques.125   This resulted in a number of radical sympathizers 
emanating from Germany but very few even considered carrying out attacks within the 
country.  Instead people like the members of the 9/11 Hamburg cell, used Germany as a 
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launching point for activities elsewhere in the world.  Today, the small amount of 
reported activity appears to mirror that of pre-9/11.  Most reported arrests have been 
related to individuals recruited to carry out activities within Iraq.  In 2001, the German 
government took steps to counter their previously lax anti-terrorism laws.  Authorities 
were now free to monitor mosques and laws have been considered to force imams to 
preach in German vice their native tongue.  Additionally, anti-terrorism laws have limited 
the protection previously given to Muslim extremists.126 
France has been the most proactive of the four countries to mitigate the 
spread of jihadist sentiment in its mosques.  Most likely this is because it was dealing 
with an Islamic terrorist problem much earlier than the other countries.  As a result, the 
French were forced to address Islamic extremists within the country and therefore got a 
step up.  Similar to what the other countries, France initially allowed foreign Muslim 
religious leaders to preach and lead the Muslim community.  Many did not speak the 
language, did not understand the culture, and were very anti-Western.  Messages were 
radical and opposed the French ideal of assimilation.  Since the 1960s France dealt with 
Algerian, Basque, and Corsican terrorists, but it wasn’t until the bombing of the Paris 
subway in 1995 by Algerian militants that the government incorporated more stringent 
anti-terrorism policies.127  In the mid-90s the French intelligence service began 
monitoring mosques, religious leaders, and the sermons.  This program was very 
effective, providing authorities the ability to identify and focus on problematic areas of 
the country.  In 2006 the intelligence service estimated that 80 of the 1,685 mosques and 
places of worship were of concern.128  By reducing the number of mosques, the French 
intelligence services are then more able to focus greater resources on the key locations.  
France has also set out to ensure imams are trained in French and represent the secular 
viewpoint espoused by the government; laws have been created to punish hate speech; 
and laws have been established to combat anti-Semitic violence and other hate crimes.129       
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b. Prisons 
The European prison system is an area which until recently was not of 
great concern to many European governments.  Once reports began surfacing which 
indicated individuals were being influenced by extremist ideology within prison, the 
governments have begun to take this threat more seriously.  The “’Shoe Bomber’ Richard 
Reid and Jose Emilio Suarez Trashorras, the Spaniard who supplied the explosives used 
in the 2004 Madrid bombings – both of whom converted while incarcerated” are 
examples of successful recruitment within the prison systems. 130   
Crime has a tendency to be higher in economically deprived areas within a 
country; as a result, prison populations are made up largely of individuals coming from 
impoverished areas and many bring with them the baggage of feeling alienated.  These 
people then are prime targets to radicalize against the government and the more secular, 
European societies.  In France for example, “Muslims account for an estimated 50 
percent of France’s prison population, with some jails on the outskirts of Paris hitting 80 
percent.”131   Even though Muslims represent a large portion of these prison populations, 
there have been very few trained imams or Muslim chaplains to provide religious 
guidance and understanding.  Prisoners then filled this role and provided guidance.  The 
concern has been that a select few prisoners can influence the larger Muslim population 
through their interpretations and sermons.  Since prisoners are cut off from the outside, it 
becomes even more difficult to refute any radical ideology which may be preached.   
Applying the concerns of radicalization within prison to the four countries 
is difficult as prison system data is relatively sparse.  Other than Reid and Trashorras, 
there has been little reporting regarding individuals who have been influenced by radical 
Islamists within prison and then going on to participate in the global jihad.  A few 
explanations for this may be: (1) those individuals which the jihad resonates with, are still 
in prison; (2) upon release, prisoners supporting the jihad have left to combat the West in 
other parts of the world; or (3) studying radical Islam was unique to the prison 
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environment and once released, the networks and religious leadership did not exist to the 
level necessary to motivate jihadist action.  Regardless of which explanation fits for each 
country, what is important is that all four countries have identified the concern for the 
spread of radical thought and interpretations of Islam.  This has resulted in increased 
efforts to incorporate religious leaders more consistent with European values as well as 
an increased surveillance of the activities within the prison system.  The possibility 
obviously exists that individuals or a small group of individuals may slip through the 
cracks, be released from prison, and carry out an attack within Europe; however, other 
than a couple of minor examples, it appears the prison system has not proven to be as 
fertile a ground for recruiting jihadists and creating sentiment towards jihad which is 
fully adopted by Muslim prisoners.     
2. Counter Radicals 
The second area regarding sentiment within Muslims communities is the presence 
and ability of counter radicals to generate a different message to deter jihadist activity.  In 
order to marginalize Islamic radicals within Europe, moderate Muslims must have a 
louder voice within their communities.  Tariq Ramadan, a moderate, “urges European 
Muslims not to shun societies in which they live but to embrace them and play as full a 
role as possible in their development.”132  By doing this, Ramadan believes Muslim 
integration into society is more likely and will play a bigger role in determining the 
direction of the country and its people.  This newly empowered feeling would then 
reduce the allure of attacking the European society by its Muslims.  Key moderate voices 
are likely to come from the elders, imams, and Muslim leaders.   
The four countries in this study have had varied results attempting to leverage a 
counter radical following.  One of the primary challenges is collaborating with particular 
groups within the Muslim community but at the same time, not giving the appearance 
that the government is involved in the process.  When this occurs, often times the Muslim 
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population is not as receptive to the efforts given their mistrust of the government.  One 
promising point regarding moderates is that a 2006 Pew Poll found:     
Consistent with these concerns, majorities or pluralities of Muslims in 
Britain (58%), France (56%), and Germany (49%) believe there is a 
struggle in their country between moderates and Islamic fundamentalists. 
Again, Spanish Muslims differ from their European counterparts, with a 
majority (65%) saying they do not see such a struggle. In all four 
European countries – and especially in France – those who do see a 
struggle heavily side with moderates.133 
Taking this data and applying it to efforts made by each of the countries in this study will 
help to bring to light the potential impact incorporating the moderate voice into the 
community may have. 
The United Kingdom’s efforts to build relations with moderates have been 
proactive, but creating a united group has been difficult given the wide range of national 
origins and cultures of the different Muslim groups within the UK.  In 2005, the British 
government established seven working groups comprised of Muslim leaders and experts 
to tackle some of the concerns and problems within and against the Muslim community.  
There have been a number of skeptics to this program who have pointed out that those 
moderates within the UK willing to work with the government have been co-opted and 
some of the individuals involved are not as moderate as the government would like to 
believe.134  An ICM poll conducted within the UK Muslim community prior to the 
establishment of the working groups should have shed some light for the government and 
the challenges it would face.  According to the poll, 45% of the respondents stated they 
felt the Muslim Council of Britain did not reflect their own views.  Additionally, 49% felt 
the religious leaders did not represent their views either.135  The official website of the 
Muslim Council of Britain states that the organization’s primary aims and objectives are: 
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i To promote cooperation, consensus and unity on Muslim affairs in the 
UK.  ii To encourage and strengthen all existing efforts being made for the 
benefit of the Muslim community. iii To work for a more enlightened 
appreciation of Islam and Muslims in the wider society. iv To establish a 
position for the Muslim community within British society that is fair and 
based on due rights. v To work for the eradication of disadvantages and 
forms of discrimination faced by Muslims. vi To foster better community 
relations and work for the good of society as a whole.136 
Given the poll data of the Muslim community, it does not appear that the Muslim Council 
of Britain is achieving its’ desired objectives.  Since an organization within the Muslim 
community is having problems creating a single, uniting voice, it is unlikely the British 
government will have any greater success working publicly with members of the Muslim 
community. 
Spain’s efforts with moderates have faired about as well as the UK’s have.  A 
primary problem for Spain is that the government has for the most part been very hands 
off in its dealings with the Muslim community.  Little effort was made to integrate 
Muslims and Spain has relied upon two Islamic organizations, the Federation of Spanish 
Islamic Entities and the Union of Islamic Communities in Spain, to assist in bridging the 
divide between the Muslim and non-Muslim communities.137  These efforts have proven 
difficult given the unstructured religious practices which exist within Spain.  Going back 
to the government’s inactivity within developing mosques and religious leadership, 
Muslim groupings have been scattered throughout Spain.  This makes creating 
representation for the differing groups difficult since many are not registered, are varied 
in their beliefs and motivations, and locations are difficult to pinpoint.  Also creating 
difficulty for establishing moderate representation is the results from the 2006 Pew 
Global Attitudes survey which revealed 65% of the Muslims polled did not even feel 
there was a struggle between moderates and Islamic fundamentalists in Spain.138  When a 
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problem cannot even be identified, it is not as likely people are going to see a need to buy 
into moderate voices.  This disunity could prove difficult in the future. 
Germany is the one country already with a largely religious moderate population 
based on the large percentage of Turkish and Yugoslav Muslims.  Because the bulk of the 
population is of a similar origin, Germany has had more success incorporating 
organizations which represent the Muslim population and interact as a go-between for the 
Muslim and non-Muslim populations.  The primary organization established to represent 
Germany’s Turkish population is the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs 
(DİTİB), founded in 1984.  A primary concern for this organization is that it serves as an 
instrument of the Turkish state to prevent opposition to the Turkish diaspora. This 
obviously creates conflict with the other Muslim communities within Germany, but it 
does serve as a voice to reach the Turkish population.139  Table 12 identifies some of the 
primary Muslim organizations within Germany and their sizes.  As seen, there are some 
other very key focal points which the German government can leverage to combat 
sentiment for the global jihad.  The success at incorporating these organizations into the 
government’s efforts may be beneficial to reduce action.  In addition to recognizing and 
working with some of these primary Muslim organizations, the German government also 
made efforts to reduce potential activity by what were deemed more radical 
organizations.  The German Interior Ministry banned a number of organizations it 
believed were involved in terrorism, to include, “the DHKP-C, Dev Sol, Hizb-ut Tahrir, 
the PKK, and organizations connected with HAMAS.”140  In banning these 
organizations, the German government believes sentiment favoring the jihad is less likely 
to take hold within the country.         
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Table 12.   German Muslim Federations and Affiliates (2006)141 
German Muslim Federations and Affiliates  
 Member 
organizations Members 
Cultural centers / Prayer 
spaces 
DITIB 300  110,000-150,000 780-880 
ZMD 18 12,000-20,000 400 
VIKZ 300 21,000-100,000 200-300 
IR 32 140,000 700 
IGMG 16 26,500 400-600 
IGD  600 30-40 
AABF 90 25,000 n/a 
 
France is once again progressive in its efforts to work with the Muslim 
community.  Although there are around 1,600 different Muslim associations and mosques 
within France, the French government worked with the Muslim community to establish 
the French Council for the Muslim Religion (CFCM) in 2003.  The CFCM’s role is not to 
represent all Muslims in France; instead it serves as a forum between the French 
government and the Muslim population.  It allows for broad representation across the 
various Muslim communities through an electoral system where two thirds of the 
officials within the CFCM are elected by the French Muslims and the other one third is 
appointed by Muslim organizations and mosques.142  Although more radical Muslims 
within France have not participated in the CFCM, it appears to have helped deter 
sentiment towards the jihad.  In 2003, the French Minister of Interior, Nicolas Sarkozy, 
noted that after the creation of the CFCM, violence within Muslim suburbs had been 
reduced. 
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C. CONCLUSION 
Measuring the sentiment Muslim populations have towards the jihad is based on 
internal factors as well as the ability of the jihadist message to spread.  From an internal 
perspective, Marc Sageman’s link theory approach to terrorist networks provides vital 
insight into the likelihood of attacks occurring.  Analysis has highlighted that groups with 
direct ties to the al Qaeda core have been involved in a significantly larger number of the 
successful and planned attacks within Europe.  These ties have proven to focus upon 
national origin, most specifically Pakistani and Middle Eastern.  Additionally, some 
North African groups involved in training and support of al Qaeda while it operated 
terrorist training camps in Afghanistan have also maintained a greater level of devotion 
and support of the ideology.   
In order for the jihadist message to spread and resonate there must reside an 
ability to recruit as well as an absence or lack of a counter radical message.  Recruitment 
has occurred in a myriad of locations, but mosques appear to have yielded the best results 
to date.  A primary problem has been governmental actions to minimize the ability 
mosques have to influence jihadist sentiment.  Progressive steps to train homegrown 
religious leaders, deport radical sympathizers, and monitor mosques and religious leaders 
has yielded much greater results than passive actions allowing foreign imams to preach in 
the local mosques with little to no surveillance.  From a counter radical perspective, those 
countries which were able to establish Muslim associations which serve as a conduit 
between the government and Muslim communities have done a much better job of 
reducing tensions and alleviating problems which may flare up between the government 
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V. AL QAEDA IDEOLOGY AND RESONANCE  
Looking at al Qaeda and its desires for global jihad, the first thing to take into 
account is the organization’s ultimate objective.  As stated by bin Laden himself, al 
Qaeda desires to “provoke and bait” the United States and its western allies into bleeding 
wars” creating significant economic hardship, forcing Western influence out of the 
Islamic world.  Al Qaeda can then focus on destroying its “near enemies” (apostate 
regimes) within the Islamic world and subsequently establish an Islamic caliphate ruled 
by Shari’ah law.143  In order to achieve these objectives, especially within Europe, the 
organization builds upon the concept of operating as an ideology rather than an entity.  
With this operational concept the organization hopes to provide direction and inspiration 
from the core al Qaeda leadership which then filters down to operational components of 
al Qaeda as well as other groups linked with or inspired by its messages.  FBI Director 
Robert Mueller highlighted three tiers within the al Qaeda ideological construct: 1) at the 
top is the traditional organization; 2) in the middle is small hybrid groups operating as al 
Qaeda franchises; 3) the final layer is homegrown, self-radicalized extremists with no 
formal affiliation to al Qaeda but oftentimes inspired by the messages of violence.144  
The organization’s ability to gain support and provide direction to these various entities 
establishes the likelihood of jihadist actions within various regions around the world.   
Overlaying this idea onto Western European countries, it is apparent Al Qaeda’s 
message must resonate with European Muslims in order for the global jihad to have 
opportunities for success within Europe.  Two critical factors in gaining European 
Muslim support are tying messages and actions to the foreign policy issues (both past and 
present) of target countries and utilizing/competing with other Islamic groups operating 
within Europe.  Both of these areas will be examined in greater detail in the pages to 
follow. 
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Although al Qaeda primarily focuses on surrogates to support its’ operations, its’ 
global reach cannot be overlooked.  A 2004 Taylor and Francis Group report indicated, 
“[p]ermanent or semi-permanent Al-Qaeda organizations have been found in 76 nations 
in five continents, and Al-Qaeda cells composed of nationals or resident immigrants have 
been broken up in Western countries such as Spain, England, France, Holland, Germany, 
Italy, and Belgium, all home to Islamic communities.”145  This is concerning as al Qaeda 
terrorists have been able to blend into the Muslim communities in an attempt to expand 
their support base as well as to establish financial connections with the West.  Also since 
the war in Afghanistan began in late 2001, al Qaeda’s leadership has been fragmented 
from its active cells.  In order for the leadership to provide direction and control, al Qaeda 
now relies more upon the media to spread its’ messages.  To date, it appears the 
organization has been successful in this method; as a result, al Qaeda has attracted 
European Muslims sympathetic to its fight and unable to attend the terrorist training 
camps which once existed within Afghanistan.   
A. FOREIGN POLICY 
In his 1996 Declaration of War against the United States and its Western allies, 
Osama bin Laden states that the foreign policies of the West against Muslims across the 
globe are at the heart of the conflict.  Bin Laden based his proclamation upon perceived 
oppression and injustices (both current and past) caused by the West.146  The primary 
foreign policy issue used in attempts to galvanize European Muslims is the involvement 
of European countries in the war against terror, proclaiming it is in fact a war against 
Islam.  According to a 2005 CRS report, “[t]hey [European Muslims] tend to view the 
‘war on terrorism’ as a war on Islam, and perceive an unjust double standard at work in 
the foreign policies of many European governments, especially those that supported the 
U.S.-led war in Iraq.”147  With Iraq and direct support to the United States at the forefront 
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of the foreign policy issues, al Qaeda has been able to gain support within some countries 
much easier than others.  As analyzed below, the United Kingdom and Spain are two 
striking examples of foreign policy being paramount in jihadist actions against those 
countries; while Germany and France prove to be a bit murkier, however with an 
intertwining of colonial and peripheral actions, these countries are brought into the fore 
regarding their foreign policy issues but create questions regarding the priority placed on 
foreign policies as drivers of jihadist action.   
The United Kingdom, a steadfast supporter of the United States with over 10,000 
troops deployed to Iraq148 and Afghanistan149 is naturally the primary European target of 
al Qaeda and its sympathizers.  Based on the focus of foreign policy issues, the UK 
would appear to provide al Qaeda with a vast potential of recruits to its ideology.  
According to a 2004 ICM research poll, nearly 70% of Muslims polled within the UK felt 
the war on terrorism is a war against Islam.150  Marrying this data with successful and 
foiled attacks within the UK, it would appear groups within the British Muslim 
population are disillusioned with the government and its foreign policy actions abroad.  
In addition to concerns over British actions in Iraq, al Qaeda sympathizers believe British 
foreign policy establishes a double standard by preaching the tenets of democracy while 
simultaneously practicing or tolerating oppression of the ummah.151  This only increases 
the negative perceptions of the British and likely helps to fuel recruitment of jihadists 
within the UK.  Lastly, with regard to the UK, al Qaeda is able to emphasize the colonial 
conquests of the British.  During its colonial expansion, Britain controlled a large number 
of territories around the world; most significant to al Qaeda and its jihadists were the 
conquests of large portions of the Middle East, South Asia, and a smaller presence within 
Northern Africa (see figure 4).  This colonial control and influence has proven to be yet 
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another rallying point for al Qaeda in its drive to garner support against the UK.  
According to American Middle East professor, Juan Cole,  
From al-Qaeda's point of view, the political unity of the Muslim world 
was deliberately destroyed by a one-two punch. First, Western colonial 
powers invaded Muslim lands and detached them from the Ottoman 
Empire or other Muslim states.152   
 
Figure 4.   Anachronous Map of British Colonies153 
Spain is another European country which helps to emphasize bin Laden’s claim 
that foreign policies are the target of the global jihad.  The Madrid train bombings in 
March 2004 reportedly were based on Spanish military presence in Iraq and were timed 
to coincide with general elections within Spain.  The belief by jihadists was that the 
attacks would lead to diminished support and subsequent fall of the conservative party 
followed by troop withdrawal from Iraq.  As it turned out, this was exactly what 
transpired.  Terrorist statements confirmed this was the goal of the Madrid train bombing.  
Abu Dujana al Afghani, the “military spokesman for Al Qaeda in Europe” stated the 
Madrid attacks were “a response to the crimes that you have caused in the world, and 
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specifically in Iraq and Afghanistan.”154  Following the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, 
police have continued to make Islamic terror related arrests within Spain.  This leads one 
to believe that the foreign policy related to troops in Iraq was one of a number of issues 
which al Qaeda and the jihadists have created to establish support within Spain.  Some 
additional factors may include the fact there are 700 Spanish troops supporting the 
NATO mission in the war on terror within Afghanistan as well as a myriad of internal 
counter-terrorism initiatives aimed at reducing jihadist actions within the country.155   A 
final battle cry which has been used by al Qaeda has been Spain’s historical location.  
This is based on a “historical battle against Spain with the aim of reoccupying Andalus, 
the areas of southern Spain that were conquered by the Muslim armies during the Islamic 
expansion following the death of the Prophet Muhammad.”156  Given al Qaeda’s 
proclivity towards playing on historical events, Andalus offers ample opportunity to 
gather support in the battle against the West. 
Germany is a European country which did not support the war in Iraq and had 
little in the way of colonial conquests within the Middle East, South Asia, and Northern 
Africa.  As a result, this may help to explain why there is apparently significantly less 
jihadist activity occurring within the country.  The primary policies which appear to have 
been triggers for planned attacks within Germany were based on its direct support to the 
United States.  This support includes the basing of U.S. forces within Germany which are 
then deployed into various countries within the South Asian and Middle Eastern region; 
the deployment of  3,000 troops to Afghanistan in support of the war on terror; and its 
operation of a military base on the Uzbekistan-Afghanistan border.157  What appears to 
have not been played upon by jihadists, and runs counter to the foreign policy theory, is 
that Germany was also involved in counter terror operations off the Horn of Africa as 
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well as providing equipment and training to Iraqi military and police in the United Arab 
Emirates.158  Having not capitalized on these aspects in gathering greater support for the 
global jihad clouds the issue of foreign policies as a primary catalyst for jihadist actions. 
France, like Germany, did not support the war in Iraq and often takes a position 
counter to U.S. foreign policy efforts; yet France found itself within the crosshairs of al 
Qaeda in late 2006.  At that time, while declaring a merger with the Algerian terrorist 
organization al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ayman al-Zawahiri identified 
France as a primary target in the global jihad.  He focused on three key components of 
French policy: assistance to U.S. operations in Afghanistan; support of UN Resolution 
1701 on Lebanon; and promoting secularism which he portrayed as negatively impacting 
true Muslims.159  Excluding operations within Afghanistan, it appears tying foreign 
policy into the equation was desirable by both al Qaeda and AQIM.  From al Qaeda’s 
perspective, it helped to franchise and spread the ideology while at the same time 
providing AQIM with increased legitimacy and likely financial and logistical support for 
its more regional actions.  In addition to the foreign policy issues highlighted above, both 
al Zawahiri and AQIM’s leader, Abu Musab Abdul Wadud, have focused their efforts on 
anti-colonial rhetoric.  Wadud states French colonial actions in Algeria have been 
“replete with crimes and injustices, domination and tyranny, genocide and murder, exile 
and eviction.”160  Like Germany, however, once again, it appears al Qaeda has not fully 
focused on the supposed foreign policy link it adheres to in targeting European countries.  
In this instance, France serves as a member of Coalition Task Force (CTF) 150 which 
conducts naval patrols between Afghanistan, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Horn of 
Africa, attempting to interdict the movement of terrorists.161  Given these operations are 
conducted not only in support of operations within Afghanistan but also Operation 
IRAQI FREEDOM and that they are carried out with countries as notable as the United 
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States and the United Kingdom, it would appear this would be a primary point of 
contention for al Qaeda and its surrogates; however, released statements and direction to 
al Qaeda operatives and sympathizers have not alluded to these actions.  This once again 
indicates although foreign policy issues have been important drivers in jihadist sentiment 
in some countries, it appears they have been much murkier within others.   
B. SURROGATE AND COMPETING GROUPS 
The presence of various Islamic groups (radical and otherwise) operating within 
Europe has the potential to infringe upon al Qaeda’s ability to attract and gain the support 
of local Muslim populations.  There are various surrogate organizations which have 
accepted the beliefs of al Qaeda, (i.e., Ansar al Islam, AQIM, and the Moroccan Islamic 
Combatant Group, among others).  With these organizations the al Qaeda core provides 
an ideological vision and in some instances may even offer some general guidance for 
action and planning; however, for the most part these surrogate organizations are 
concerned about regional issues, made up primarily of a collection of local extremists 
with local agendas.  These agendas may coincide with those of al Qaeda, but in general 
they operate under the same principle that terror against the West is a necessity to achieve 
their desired objectives.  With this construct, al Qaeda can play upon the violence.  A 
second group discussed in chapter IV is counter radicals which offer a different 
viewpoint than that of radical elements within the communities.  The strengths and 
weaknesses of this group have been highlighted, but they once again can play upon al 
Qaeda’s ability to influence local European Muslim populations into radical action.  One 
element not yet discussed is that of groups competing with al Qaeda.  As will be 
analyzed, many of these groups operate along a fine line between radical and moderate 
actions.  They primarily serve to provide direction and clarity to Muslims but have the 
potential to mold and shape minds into radical action.  The groups most prevalent within 
Europe and to be discussed include: Hizb ut-Tahrir, Tablighi Jamaat, and the Muslim 
Brotherhood.  
 62
1. Surrogate Organizations 
Al Qaeda and its push for global jihad realizes that it is not large enough, nor 
capable of carrying out this feat on its own.  As a result, the organization relies on 
surrogate groups to adopt its ideology, listen to its messages, and to support its goals.  
Obviously some groups are tied more closely to al Qaeda than others.  The organization 
has been able to garner direct support through an exchange of goods and services with 
other organizations worldwide.  Turning the focus to Europe, al Qaeda employs a number 
of groups in this manner; however there are a handful which actively operate across 
multiple countries within Europe and pose a significant threat to the continent.  Although 
these groups have varied backgrounds and goals, they all are united against a common 
enemy, the West, as well as through the ideology which they adopted, that being Salafist 
Jihadism.  The Salafi jihad is characterized as a religious revival movement desiring to 
reestablish an Islamic Caliphate.  What sets the Salafists apart from other fundamentalists 
is that they advocate the use of violent jihad against foreign non-Muslim governments in 
an attempt to satisfy their desired end state.  Al Qaeda as the vanguard of this movement 
has helped to collaborate operations and to install the initial connections within the 
network.162  The Salafist groups operating within Europe have three main objectives for 
their operations: support and justification for terror, rejection of integration, and the 
creation of an Islamic State in Europe.163  With an understanding of their goals and 
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a. Takfir Wa al-Hijra (Excommunication and Exodus) 
Formed in Egypt in the 1970s, Takfir is now one of the most 
fundamentalist and feared active terrorist groups.  Although the group operating within 
Europe is not believed to be directly linked with the original Egyptian organization, it has 
taken the same name and ideology.  The group appears to be unstructured with no clear 
leadership.  Some view it as a “web incorporating scattered groups of militants, separated 
by geography, connected only by radical ideology.”164  Since this group has been linked 
to extremely violent acts of terror, a primary concern is the techniques it employs to 
infiltrate societies.  Incorporating elements of subterfuge, group members often times 
adopt the westernized lifestyle and languages of the European countries within which 
they reside.  Through the adoption of non-Islamic appearances and principles, members 
can then more easily infiltrate into society and are then more likely to be able to move 
and operate freely, avoiding surveillance of counter-terrorist operations.  Takfir justifies 
the use of these non-Islamic practices in that the ends justify the means.165        
Over the past few years Takfir has been linked to a couple of highly 
publicized incidents within Europe.  The group has been connected to the 2004 murder of 
Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh.  Additionally it is believed that the group had 
connections to the 3/11 Madrid train bombings and was plotting an attack against a 
Spanish Court of Law in the same year.166    
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b. Ansar al-Islam (Supporters of Islam) 
Ansar, formed in 2001 in the Kurdish north of Iraq, desires to establish an 
Islamic caliphate in the area referred to as Kurdistan.  Following the kickoff of OIF in 
2003, the group refocused its efforts and its primary goal now is to drive out the coalition 
presence within Iraq and then to establish an Islamic state in all of Iraq.167  
Over the past few years Ansar al-Islam has established an extensive 
network within Europe.  Although, to date, no direct attacks within Europe have been 
attributed to the group, it is believed that Ansar has used its operatives and connections 
within Europe to facilitate the assistance of the jihad within Iraq.  Arrests and 
investigations have pointed to a network which provides two-way traffic for mujahideen 
recruits between Iraq and the European continent.  This has established fears that 
eventually Europe will be transformed into an operational jihad as well.168  
Primary activities of the group within Europe indicate that it is focused on 
providing logistical support for the Iraqi Jihad.  The group has used crime to gain 
finances, recruit and funnel fighters, and plan attacks.  However, arrests within Germany 
have identified plots by the group to bring direct action into Europe.  German counter-
terrorist forces uncovered plots to conduct an assassination attempt of former Iraqi Prime 
Minister Iyad Allawi on a visit to Berlin, as well as plans to attack a NATO summit 
meeting.169  Although these actions were thwarted, it points to the group’s desire to 
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c. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) 
AQIM, formerly known as the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat 
(GSPC), is an Algerian Salafist group established in 1996, splintering from the Armed 
Islamic Group (GIA).  The primary disagreement was based on the GIA’s belief that 
civilians constituted legitimate targets.  As a result the AQIM was established with a goal 
of overthrowing the Algerian government and establishing an Islamic state.170  Since its 
inception, AQIM success against the Algerian government declined, which may be part 
of the reason the organization began looking at other areas to carry out operations.  By 
expanding into Europe, it is likely AQIM not only gained more international notoriety, 
but it also established international networks and funding for a larger goal.  In 2003 
several AQIM leaders acknowledged the group’s shift toward support of the global jihad 
as they pledged allegiance to al Qaeda and its objectives.  Although it has taken a few 
years, it appears al Qaeda has begun to see the importance of AQIM’s networks within 
Europe.  In September 2006, Ayman al-Zawahiri identified the merger of the two groups 
and called for attacks against the U.S., France, and other allies.   
Over the past couple of years, a number of terror cells and plots linked 
directly to AQIM have been uncovered within Europe.  Although no specific attacks have 
been linked to AQIM as of yet, the organization has been active in Germany, Italy, Spain, 
France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Britain.  “Some of the high profile operations 
planned included a plot to blow up the U.S. Embassies in Paris and Rome, and attacks on 
the Christmas market in Strasbourg, France and the G-8 summit in Genoa.”171 
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d. Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) 
The GICM, established in the late 1990s, was created with the goal of 
establishing an Islamic State in Morocco.  Since its inception, the group has also 
proclaimed support for al-Qaeda’s jihad against the West.  A number of individuals 
connected to al Qaeda and its terrorist training camps in Afghanistan established the 
group, explaining the devoted support proclaimed for al Qaeda.  GICM members also are 
believed to interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe.172   
The GICM is believed to have operatives in numerous European countries, 
to include: UK, Denmark, Belgium, Spain and France.  The group was involved in 
planning the suicide bombings in Casablanca in May 2003, which killed 30 people.  It is 
also one of the primary groups connected to the 2004 Madrid Train Bombings.173  
e. Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigade 
This is a group’s actual existence is questionable, but requires mention 
given some of its claims regarding attacks.  The group was first mentioned in 2003 and 
has released numerous statements from Spain and the UK.  A number of these statements 
are likely false, but there is possible credence in others.  For example they claimed 
responsibility for the 2003 northeastern U.S. blackouts, Jakarta bombings, and 2004 
Madrid Train Bombing.  It is unlikely the group was involved in any of these actions as 
other causes or perpetrators have been identified.  On the other hand the group has laid 
claim to a few attacks within Iraq, which may or may not be likely.  Regardless of the 
group’s role in any of these proclamations, it is likely a collection of individuals within 
Europe providing ideological visions and promoting al-Qaeda's European operations.174 
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2. Competing Organizations 
a. Hizb Ut-Tahrir (Party of Liberation) 
Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was founded in Jordanian-controlled Jerusalem in 
1953 in an effort to remove western control of the Islamic world in order to then 
transform the entire ummah into a single caliphate operating under Sharia law.  The 
organization is believed to have tens of thousands of supporters operating across the 
globe.  Unlike al Qaeda’s surrogate groups operating within Europe, HT has attempted to 
achieve its objectives through nonviolent means even though some of the group’s rhetoric 
has been radical in nature.   
In order to achieve its goal of a global caliphate, HT develops its support 
through three stages: “First they convert new members.  Secondly they establish a 
network of secret cells, and finally, they try to infiltrate the government to work to 
legalize their party and its aims.”175  The group has been successful in establishing the 
first two stages of its methodology, but the final stage has yet to materialize in any of the 
countries which HT operates within. 
Although HT has proclaimed achievement of its objectives should be done 
peacefully, its rhetoric has been radical.  Concerning the employment of suicide bombers 
in Israel, group members have supported these actions as legitimate acts of 
martyrdom.176  Additionally, HT members have “called for a jihad against the U.S., its 
allies, and moderate Muslim states.” The purpose of the jihad is “to find and kill the 
Kufar (non-believers),” in fact rejecting the Islamic notion of Greater Jihad against one's 
own as a sin.”177  As a result of its radical rhetoric, Germany banned the organization in 
2003 stating the group was promoting extremism and anti-Semitism.  The group also 
                                                 
175 Hizb ut-Tahrir.org, “Hizb Ut-Tahrir,” http://www.hizb-uttahrir.org/index.php/EN/def (accessed 
November 2007). 
176 BBC News Online, “Hizb Ut-Tahrir,” 27 August 2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight /3182271.stm (accessed November 2007). 
177 Ariel Cohen, “Hizb Ut-Tahrir: An Emerging Threat to U.S. Interests in Central Asia,” 
(Washington, DC: Heritage Foundation, 30 May 2003), http://www.heritage.org/Research/ 
RussiaandEurasia/BG1656.cfm#pgfId-1028441 (accessed November 2007). 
 68
came under scrutiny within the United Kingdom in 2004 for spreading anti-Semitic 
propaganda.  Even though the group has been accused of attempting to spread messages 
of hate and violence, it has yet to be linked to any overt actions supporting or carrying out 
of violent attacks or terrorism.  
Given HT’s stated policy of nonviolent methods to establish the caliphate, 
it has also come under scrutiny from more radical organizations linked to al Qaeda.   
Members of the GICM stated that HT’s methods of nonviolence to achieve its objectives 
are weak and accused it of being moderate rather than strictly religious.178  This likely 
eliminates a significant number of HT members from becoming more radical and desiring 
to seek out al Qaeda and other like-minded organizations since these statements highlight 
disunity between the two mentalities and therefore indicate a lack of networks connecting 
the groups.   
Since the organization operates through a network of underground cells, it 
is a concern to western governments.  Closely associated with this is political opportunity 
theory which “argues that a group could become violent if it faces an environment which 
offers political opportunities.”179  As the group grows stronger and develops more 
resources, it has the potential to push for a greater role within some European 
communities and given its radical rhetoric, some members could feel empowered to carry 
out radical attacks in support of the overarching objectives. 
b. Tablighi Jamaat (Proselytizing Group) 
The Tablighi Jamaat is an Islamic missionary and fundamentalist revival 
movement established in British India in the late 1920s.  The group's membership spans 
more than 150 countries around the world.  The primary aims of the movement are to 
preach a return to purist Islamic values and recruit other Muslim men to propagate the 
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faith through grassroots journeys, preaching to Muslims and visiting Muslim homes door 
to door.  Since the members encourage other Muslims to join the spiritual journeys, any 
Muslim can join with no strict membership rules.180     
Since 9/11, the group has come under considerable examination from a 
number of western countries.  Although the group does not overtly promote violent 
activity nor is it involved in any political actions, it does appear to serve as a conduit for 
radicals to establish connections and to gain access to countries under the guise of 
missionary work.  Since the group has few restrictions upon membership and the fact it 
does not conduct any type of background investigations into its members, it does offer an 
opportunity for radicals to penetrate the organization.  A couple of notable names which 
began their fundamentalist ideology through the Tablighi Jamaat include the shoe 
bomber, Richard Reid, as well as the American Taliban John Walker Lindh.  Although it 
does not appear the Tablighi Jamaat inspired these individuals to become radicalized, it 
did provide them with the fundamentalist concepts and networks required to radicalize 
their beliefs.  Although many people have a benign view of radical actions or support by 
the Tablighi, a number of terror suspects are being held based on links to the Tablighi 
Jamaat.  Within Europe, the primary concern about the Tablighi is that it serves as an 
intermediary between radical organizations and individuals seeking to support terror.  
Given that a number of missions for Tablighi members involve travel and journeys 
through Pakistan, it is also increasingly more likely that European members of the 
organization will come in contact with radical individuals or groups which may promote 
the networks to facilitate support and potential attacks within Europe. 
c. Muslim Brotherhood 
The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, was established in 
response to British occupation of Egypt and the penetration of Western values into Arab 
society.  It desired to replace Western law with Sharia and to establish an Islamic 
Caliphate lawfully through opposition to violence and adoption of political actions.  
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Since that time, the Muslim Brotherhood has spread to more than 70 countries, providing 
a myriad of services to Muslim communities.  Through the establishment of charitable 
organizations, the Brotherhood has created a wide network of social, religious, health, 
and educational systems.  The organization’s numerous businesses can then be utilized to 
employ local members, sympathizers, as well as a means of generating income.181 
Two competing theories have been generated regarding the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s actions and desires.  One states that the organization is fundamentalist in 
nature (calling for the adoption of Sharia and the Caliphate) and is not involved in the 
support of terrorism.  The second theory follows that the organization is not only 
fundamentalist, but it is also actively engaged in terrorist activity.  Although some 
modern radical ideologues (i.e., Sayyid Qutb, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and Ramzi Yousef) 
have Islamic Fundamentalist formative ties back to the Muslim Brotherhood, they did not 
fully radicalize until splitting off from the organization.182   
The roots of the Muslim Brotherhood within Europe began to develop in 
the early 1950s when thousands of Muslims emigrated from the Middle East to avoid 
repression and in response to employment opportunities.  Similar to Hizb ut-Tahrir and 
Jamaat Tablighi, the organization’s actions within Europe appear to be based on a desire 
to spread its fundamentalist beliefs without incorporating violence in order to achieve 
those objectives.  According to the group’s head of the European Fatwa Council, Sheikh 
Yusuf-al Qaradawi, “[w]ith Allah’s will, Islam shall return to Europe, and Europeans 
shall convert to Islam.  They will then be able to propagate Islam to the world.  I affirm 
that this time, the conquest will not be done by the sword but by proselytism and 
ideology.”183  Supporting this statement are the actions of the Muslim Brotherhood.  The 
Brotherhood has attempted to “organize[sic] Muslims into visible and active 
communities, with institutions and establishment figures, while promoting publicly 
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visible education and social services.”184  The Brotherhood can focus the European 
Muslim communities on internal matters leading to an ability to integrate into the inner 
workings of the country without actually assimilating.  By doing this, the Brotherhood 
then establishes the lead role in providing the social support and services needed by the 
community.  This then has the capability for the Brotherhood to have greater influence on 
community actions and direction.    
The Muslim Brotherhood is yet another organization competing with al 
Qaeda and like-minded radical groups for the support of European Muslims.  The 
primary concern currently regarding the Muslim Brotherhood is that its fundamentalist 
preaching influences some of the group’s followers to become increasingly more 
radicalized and then to leave the organization in order to join more radical elements.  
Also concerning, is given the organization’s large size and geographical reach, 
individuals desiring more radical interpretations have networks in place to locate and 
connect with other radical organizations.   
C. CONCLUSION 
In order for al Qaeda to spread its ideology, it must ensure the organization’s 
message resonates with the target audience.  Two factors are central to establishing 
support: negatively portraying a country’s foreign policy and the ability to interact and 
compete with other organizations.  Al Qaeda’s main thrust on foreign policy is to create 
the perception that the United States and its allies are in a battle against Islam as opposed 
to terrorism.  This quickly stirred up violence against the UK, helped generate attacks 
against Spain, and may be part of the reason there has been limited activity against 
Germany and France.  Al Qaeda’s ability to utilize or compete with other Islamic groups 
operating in Europe also factors into its ability to generate its message.  Numerous 
groups, having accepted the ideology of al Qaeda, serve as surrogate organizations, 
following the ideology and utilizing general guidance to carry out their actions.  To date, 
most organizations which have been successful in carrying out attacks within Europe 
have served in some form or another as a surrogate to al Qaeda (whether directly linked 
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or having only adopted the ideology).  There are also a number of other Islamic groups 
(radical and otherwise) operating within Europe which walk a thin line between radical 
and moderate actions.  The ability of these groups to operate in Europe impacts the ability 
of al Qaeda to gain supporters for its message.   
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VI. EUROPEAN COUNTER-TERRORISM (CT) EFFORTS 
Each of the target countries has dealt with terrorism in its past.  The policies 
developed were influenced by the type of terrorist organization they were dealing with at 
the time, leading to a different approach for each country.  Likewise, each country has 
dealt with their Muslim population in their own unique way.  By analyzing the 
differences, the goal is to identify if there is a link between these differences and the 
divergent results for the current fight against terrorism.  For example, did one country 
already face a threat similar to that faced by jihadists after 9/11.  Or did the country deal 
with a primarily internal terrorist element, leading counter terrorism policy to have to 
adjust to a mix of internal and external elements. 
A. HISTORICAL EFFORTS IN EACH COUNTRY 
All four of the sample countries have had to deal with terrorism prior to 9/11.  By 
evaluating the policies implemented, it may be possible to determine why there is a 
differing level of success in countering Islamic terrorism today. 
1. Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army 
Great Britain primarily faced a separatist movement in Northern Ireland led by the 
Irish Republican Army (IRA).  The British government’s initial approach was to 
criminalize terrorism, dismissing the IRA as an insignificant, evil, and marginalized 
minority supported by an insignificant, alienated public voting for them.  The thought 
was that the British could simply arrest the terrorists and the problem would go away.185  
However the continued success of Sinn Fein, the IRA’s political arm, forced the British 
government to analyze why people were voting for them.186   
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This analysis showed Catholics in Northern Ireland were split over the most 
effective tactics to gain the desired political end:  Militarists believed violence was the 
only solution; paramilitarists pushed for equal levels of armed struggle and political 
engagement; and electoralists believed the best method is to work through the democratic 
process.187  In Northern Ireland, the SDLP represented Catholics that had some 
investment into the national economy, making them more likely to work with existing 
political institutions.188  The British government also identified IRA demands that they 
could implement, slowly increasing paramilitarist and politico confidence in the British 
government.  This also increased the influence of the paramilitarists and politicos within 
the IRA by slowly eliminating the militarist’s justification that the only way to gain 
political objectives was through violence.189  Slowly but surely, London was able to co-
opt the IRA and Sinn Fein into legitimate political activity as both the terrorist group and 
the government realized they were better off if the minority group participated in 
politics.190 
2. Spain and ETA 
Spain’s experience is very similar to Great Britain.  Spain faced a separatist 
movement as well, this one originating in the Basque region of the country.  The Basque 
community was split as well over the way forward with militarists, paramilitarists, and 
electoralists each pushing their own agenda.191  For the Basques, the PNV represented 
those that had enough economic and political ties to Spain to desire some form of 
compromise.192  Spain also identified ETA demands that they could implement, showing 
engagement was the method for gaining change instead of violence.193  This eventually 
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led to the majority of Basques marginalizing ETA and those that supported violence.194  
Though there are some lessons learned for CT from both Spain and Great Britain, the 
question is can initiatives successfully used against separatist movements be applied to 
Islamists who want to destroy the existing government? 
3. Germany and Homegrown Terrorists 
Germany’s primary CT effort was focused on home grown left- and right-wing 
extremist organizations.  Other forms of terrorism were essentially ignored as they didn’t 
have nearly as dramatic of an impact as native terrorist organizations like the Red Army 
Faction (RAF).  However as the RAF increased its logistical links to other international 
terrorist groups and foreign governments, the German began to deepen and broaden 
police cooperation in Europe and beyond.195  In response, Germany favored international 
and European approaches to terrorism vice purely national ones.  This included formal 
agreements with other countries and pushing to create Europol to facilitate cross border 
policing.  Internally, the Germans passed laws to prevent terrorist activity as opposed to 
simply responding to it, making the mere suspicion of supporting a criminal organization 
a crime.  In the end, German policy was very effective in eliminating an RAF 
organization that in reality only had 10-20 dedicated members and only a few hundred 
supporters.196  Using the same question as above, can this experience be used by 
Germany to effectively counter Islamic terrorism? 
4. France and Islamic Terrorism 
France experienced a dramatic transition in its approach to CT.  In the 1980s and 
90s, France was considered a haven for international terrorists.  The groups were across 
the spectrum: there were home grown leftists (Action Directe); Basque, Brittan, and 
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Corsican separatists; and sanctuary for Middle Eastern and other international terrorists.  
With regard to the international terrorists, the French policy was to provide sanctuary in 
order to maintain neutrality and avoid being targeted themselves.197  In 1986, a series of 
terrorist attacks forced the French government to confront the issue.  As a filler to buy 
time to strengthen police and legal methods to counter terrorism, the French government 
developing an accommodation strategy with state sponsors of terrorism such as Syria and 
Iran.198 
During this time, France dramatically improved the focus of its CT efforts.  To 
increase coordination, France removed the seven different police services that belonged 
to four cabinet ministries and directed the justice and interior ministries to work together 
as the sole agencies for CT.  In response, the justice department created a well staffed, 
centralized court in Paris dedicated to prosecuting terrorists and supporting the needs of 
the interior ministry’s officers.199 
With this new apparatus in place, the French moved to a policy of prevention.  
This was deemed politically necessary as the potential impact of the Algerian civil war 
increased with the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) naming France as the “mother of all 
sinners.” France’s interior ministry then went on the offensive.  In November 1994, the 
French successfully dismembered the Chalabi network that supported Algerian 
revolutionaries.  In June 1995, 131 supporters of GIA and other Algerian terrorist groups 
were arrested.  France also targeted terrorist logistics networks, seeing them as the soft 
belly of terrorism.  In the end, the effective partnership between terrorism dedicated 
magistrates in the judicial ministry and the Direction du Surveillance Territoire (DST), 
the internal French intelligence agency, proved to be very effective in countering the 
Islamic terrorist threat of the 1990s.200  It is clear this capability carried through to 9/11 
and France hit the ground running in dealing with this new version of Islamic terrorism. 
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5. Conclusion 
The question asked about each country was whether their experience with 
terrorism prior to 9/11 prepared them to deal with this new threat.  Though each country 
had experience dealing with terrorism, it is clear the French had a capability that was 
already capable of dealing with Islamic terrorism the other three countries did not have 
on 9/11.  The primary reason France is in the crosshairs of jihadists has not changed:  
primarily involvement in Algerian internal affairs.  Therefore, the threat hasn’t changed 
dramatically for France. 
B. COUNTER TERRORISM INITIATIVES SINCE 9/11 
Following the attacks of 9/11, each of the four countries developed initiatives to 
deal with this new threat to their security.  The approach again is to see if there are any 
significant differences between these approaches that would explain the different levels 
of terrorist activity. 
1. Germany 
Germany quickly identified the fact that it was not positioned to deal with a 
dynamic enemy that operated outside of the RAF paradigm.  The need to improve was 
accentuated by the fact a key cell for the 9/11 attacks was based in Hamburg.  This 
required a thorough reengineering of CT organizations and the powers provided to them 
to fight terrorism.  Organizational changes included the creation of the Joint Counter 
Terrorism Center in order to consolidate the efforts of multiple offices responsible for 
CT.201  The government also granted security organizations increased access to 
telephone, banking, employment and university records of individuals.202   
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Legal changes included passing laws to increase surveillance of Islamic 
organizations within the country; this resulted in identifying and banning three 
organizations found to support terrorism.203  This was made possible by a constitutional 
change that now allows the banning of religious groups that advocate terrorism.  
Individuals who belong to or assist terrorist groups abroad are now tracked and 
prosecuted by the government.204  The German government also has increased power 
short of prosecution as well.  A new Residence Law (Aufenthaltsgesetz) tightens the 
provisions for expulsion and deportation of foreigners who practice “hate preaching” 
against other groups.205 
2. France 
As mentioned earlier, France was better positioned to meet the threat of Islamic 
terrorism.  However the government did fine tune its policy and make some changes post 
9/11.206  For example, statutory provisions seeking to prevent money laundering were 
extended to the fight against financing of terrorism.  France also authorized the use of 
undercover officers and listening devices to monitor the activity of terrorists.207  The 
judiciary department increased the power of their specialized anti-terrorist “super 
judges,” making them as much an investigator as a judge.  They are able to hold 
suspected terrorists for four days without charging them; lawyers are forbidden from 
visiting with those held the first three days of custody; and the judges can be jury as well 
with the ability to ask for a non-jury trial because of potential threats to jurors by 
terrorists.  France also thoroughly investigates all French Muslim nationals who have 
spent any time in Afghanistan and Pakistan.208 
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3. Spain 
Spain failed to make any significant changes in its approach to terrorism until the 
3/11 Madrid train bombings in 2004.  This included allowing arrest and prosecution of 
individuals for conspiring to commit acts of terror and financing terrorism.  Similar to 
France, Spain also centralized all terrorism cases at the National High Court (Audiencia 
Nacional).  The court’s staff is highly experienced in dealing with terrorist cases.  
Specific terrorism related penalties added to the Criminal Code include 8 to 14 years for 
promoting or directing armed gangs or terrorist organization; 6 to 12 years for 
membership in an armed gang or terrorist organization;. 20 to 30 years for terrorist 
murder; and a maximum prison sentence of 40 years for a person convicted of two or 
more terrorist offences.209 
4. Great Britain 
Similar to Spain, Great Britain failed to truly understand the seriousness of the 
Islamic terrorism threat prior to the July 2005 transit attacks.  Efforts were primarily 
focused on arresting individuals, with over 1,000 individuals detained on terrorism 
charges since 9/11.  Since the 2005 transit attacks, Great Britain has attempted to tone 
down the radical mosques with restrictions such as making “the glorification of 
terrorism” a criminal offense.210  The most proactive measure was initiated in February 
of this year with British officials meeting with their Pakistani counterparts to discuss a 
joint counter terrorist plan.  The interesting point is that Great Britain appeared to be a 
little late in taking this initiative, as 22 other countries had already completed similar 
agreements with Pakistan.211 
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5. Conclusion 
Because France was already dealing with Islamic terrorism, it merely had to fine 
tune its procedures to the new threat.  Germany appears to have hit the ground running 
immediately after 9/11 in response to the Hamburg Cell, possibly explaining the lack of 
successful terrorist activity in Germany.  It is clear both Spain and Great Britain were late 
in implementing serious counter terrorism efforts until each country suffered a direct 
attack.  The changes made since then could explain the lack of successful efforts since. 
C. EFFORTS TO IMPROVE MUSLIM ASSIMILATION INTO GREATER 
SOCIETY 
Each country has attempted to some extent to assimilate their Muslim populations 
into the greater society.  Some of these efforts have been symbolic, with no real intention 
of achieving success.  Others have been legitimate efforts to bring the Muslim population 
into the fold.  The question is whether there is a connection between legitimate efforts 
that have enjoyed some success and a lower level of jihadi activity.  By comparing the 
assimilation efforts of each country, a pattern may be exposed. 
1. Great Britain 
The biggest change by the British has been a swing from counterintelligence 
efforts against specific groups and individuals deemed a threat, to a policy of prevention.  
Government officials at all levels now often consult with Muslim community 
representatives prior to taking action.  This includes partnering with mosque groups in 
order to provide religious “re-education” to prison inmates and to young people deemed 
likely to hold extremist sympathies.  The police force has seen some changes as well.  
Almost 300 Muslims have joined the London Metropolitan police force, with an 
additional 3,000 Muslims added across the country nationally.  In addition, another 6,000 
community officers are to be added to provide an effective link between Muslim 
communities and the government agencies responsible for them.212  The problem is these 
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initiatives continue to maintain the distinct communities of native British and immigrant 
Muslims as opposed to a policy that seeks to assimilate the Muslim population into the 
greater society. 
2. France 
France has struggled with assimilation as well.  The 2005 riots made it clear that 
French law enforcement had only a limited ability to control the escalating crisis, as it 
had few established contacts within the Muslim communities.  Part of the reason was 
Nikolas Sarkozy, as Interior Minister, had dismantled the neighborhood policing 
infrastructure equated to a beat cop.  This is endemic of a pattern within the Ministry of 
Interior that is responsible for internal security and integration of Muslims.  Security 
concerns almost always win out over integration initiatives.  Change is often slow, 
especially when you consider there are no French Muslim Members of Parliament.213   
Issues continue in the work place as well.  Jean-François Amadieu of the 
Observatoire des Discriminations, a think tank that studies discrimination in the 
workplace, found that a job applicant whose name sounded Moroccan was six times less 
likely to get an interview than the one whose name sounded Franco-French.  Even when 
the government has set up agencies to fight this, little has happened.  The Haute Autorité 
de Lutte contre les Discriminations et pour l'Égalité, a government agency set up in 2005 
to punish employers who show bias in the workplace, received about 800 complaints but 
forwarded fewer than two dozen to the courts.214  Part of the problem is that French law 
forbids collecting information based on ethnicity, making it difficult to determine if 
progress is being made.  This makes such initiatives as affirmative action illegal in 
France.215 
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In spite of this, France has stepped forward and achieved some significant results 
in regards to assimilation.  According to Moushumi Khan of the Institute for Social 
Policy and Understanding, the 2005 riots made it clear that the “youths identified 
themselves as French and were protesting that the French republican principle of equality 
was not being applied to them (italics author’s).”  To further contact between Muslims 
and the government, Sarkozy led the formation of the Islamic Council in France, bringing 
together the Union of Islamic Organizations in France (UOIF), the National Federation of 
Muslims in France (FNMF), and the Paris Mosque.216  Though this initiative has come in 
for criticism, as Dalil Boubakeur, the current president of the Muslim Council, is often 
criticized for never having lived in an immigrant suburb or rarely visiting one.217  Other 
initiatives include creating an independent body to combat discrimination that was 
implemented in January 2005.218 
A series of poll data also highlights some success in regards to assimilation in 
France.  A 1994 study by the historian and anthropologist Emmanuel Todd showed 20 to 
30 percent of women of Algerian descent under the age of 35 living in France had 
married a French man.  This is one of the highest rates of intermarriage for Muslims in 
Europe.  In another poll conducted by the French institute CSA in 2004, more than 90 
percent of Muslims said that gender equality and other French republican values were 
important to them.  In the same poll, 68 percent of Muslims stated they favor the 
separation of church and state.  According to another CSA poll in 2005, French Muslim 
voters opposed the proposed European Union constitution at almost exactly the same 
level as did the rest of France.  Finally, even the general French population seeks at least 
some level of greater assimilation, with 50 percent stating the country needed more 
immigrants in Parliament.219 
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3. Germany 
Germany is still dealing with the impact of the myth of the guest worker.  Lina 
Ganamah of the Arab Women’s Forum in Berlin stated,  
Germans are only just beginning to realize that many of the Muslims who 
came here as ‘temporary’ guest workers have put down roots and are here 
to stay. For too long, Germany denied that it was an immigration 
destination with no proper integration programs in place. 
A first step was a May 2, 2007 conference on Islam in Berlin, bringing together Islamic 
organizations and the German government to meet and exchange ideas.220 
Germany has attempted some initiatives.  Germany’s Interior Minister, Wolfgang 
Schaeuble, proposed training for imams that could “strengthen those who can live with 
the European rule of law, universal rights and the achievements of the Enlightenment.”221  
The government also made language courses mandatory for new immigrants beginning 
on January 1, 2005.222  Germany has also made it easier for certain professionals, 
scientists, and other highly skilled workers to enter the country and provided them an 
opportunity to gain immediate permanent residency.223 
However it is clear Germany is still falling short.  To this day, many Germans still 
identify their nationality in ethnic and cultural terms and do not consider those without 
German ancestry as German.  This is due to in part because the German federal 
government has taken few nation-wide initiatives, leaving it to cities and towns to deal 
with integration.  When national politicians do speak up on the issue, their comments are 
usually more harmful than helpful.  Werner Schiffauer, professor of ethnology at the 
University of Frankfurt an der Oder, states, “The problem is the idea that the immigrants 
are the 'other' and integration is 'their' problem. Politicians have been reinforcing the 'us' 
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versus 'them' rhetoric. It shows that the Germans don't accept immigrants as part of their 
society. The dichotomy is still there.”  In the end, Muslim integration into German 
society has been minimal.224 
4. Spain 
Spain is trying to transition from mostly countering terrorism to a policy of 
assimilation.  Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Zapatero continues to increase resources 
devoted to fighting jihadi terrorism.  At the same time, he has put more stress on 
assimilating Muslims into Spanish society, rather than viewing them as possible security 
threats.  This includes legalizing nearly 700,000 illegal immigrants currently working in 
Spain.  The government is also trying to take advantage of the resentment most Spanish 
Muslim leaders have for Saudi efforts to promote its ultraconservative Wahhabi Islam in 
Spain.  The problem for the government is how to provide the funds requested to train 
Spanish-born imams while still meeting the desire for the government to maintain 
secularism.   Though a small step, the Spanish government has created a foundation to 
help minority religions integrate into Spanish society.  With a modest initial budget of 
$3.5 million, the foundation is looking to fund Spanish language instruction for 
imams.225  It is clear Spain desires to move forward with assimilation.  It is just a matter 
of whether the necessary resources will be committed to make assimilation happen. 
D. CONCLUSION 
It has been assumed that foreign policy is the main reason for the differing levels 
of terrorism in Europe.  However, there are enough differences in counter terrorism and 
assimilation policy to warrant further assessment.  France successfully dealt with Islamic 
terrorism long before 9/11 where the other three countries did not experience it until then.  
Germany was the first of the other three countries to attack Islamic terrorism, with Spain 
and Great Britain not getting fully on-board until after successful attacks against them.  
Germany’s quick response following 9/11 put it in a better position to counter Islamic 
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terrorism than Britain and Spain.  Finally, the French have always been committed to 
some form of assimilation, unlike their counterparts.  This has resulted in much more of 
the French Muslim population considering themselves French than the other sampled 
countries.  This is especially telling when it is noted that France is the number one enemy 
of AIG because of the French foreign policy objectives in Algeria.  The results therefore 
show that CT efforts are as important, if not more so, than foreign policy. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
More than a decade has passed since Osama bin Laden initially proclaimed war 
against the United States and its allies.  Over that timeframe numerous violent acts have 
been carried out by bin Laden’s al Qaeda and other organizations sympathizing with his 
organization’s ideology and messages opposed to the West.  What once began as attacks 
against western interests within developing countries, has evolved into barbaric acts 
within the borders of some of the world’s most developed and advanced countries in the 
world (i.e., the United States, Great Britain, and Spain).  Given Europe’s closer proximity 
to the Middle East, its large immigrant Muslim populations, and perceived deficiencies in 
controlling cross-border traffic, bin Laden and al Qaeda have focused on western Europe 
as a means to impair not only Europe, but more importantly to cripple the United States 
economically, hoping to eventually force the U.S. and its allies out of the Middle East 
and Muslim lands.     
Since al Qaeda took a unique interest in targeting many western European 
countries, the question has been raised as to why some countries have suffered violent 
attacks while others have not.  On the surface, this appears an easy question according to 
many terrorism experts: violence in Western Europe is directly correlated to the foreign 
policy issues of the individual countries.  More specifically it is argued that those 
countries directly involved in the Iraq war are the ones falling in the direct crosshairs of 
al Qaeda inspired violence.  Brushing aside this initial argument and digging a little 
deeper, it appears there are a number of other critical factors (social status levels, national 
origin, ability to generate support, domestic policies for immigration, and counter 
terrorism initiatives) at play as well.  In some cases these are just as integral, if not more 
so, than the Iraqi foreign policy debate.  The one constant with these varying critical 
factors is that the importance of each is different for each of the countries in this study. 
In order to make this review manageable, four western European countries have 
been analyzed: France, Germany, Great Britain, and Spain.  These were selected due to 
the fact each has had differing levels of internal jihadist activity, while at the same time 
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each country has developed its own domestic and foreign policy initiatives to counter its 
terrorist threat.  Comparing the dynamics of the critical factors in each country provides 
valuable insight into determining why there are differing levels of violence between each 
country within Europe.  Although this data can not be overlaid directly onto all countries 
within Europe, it can help to identify potential problem areas for other countries and may 
highlight efforts which have proven successful in mitigating jihadist sentiment and 
action.   
Dissecting and analyzing the status levels of the Muslim populations in each 
country is important since oftentimes European Muslims are viewed as a monolith—
portraying the area as one Europe with one mass of identical Muslims.  On the contrary, 
Europe’s Muslims are quite distinct and varied not only between each country but also 
within each country.  Based on this, it appears there are some critical factors which may 
tie the status levels within each country to the varying levels of jihadist activity within 
France, Spain, Germany, and Great Britain.  Looking at the Muslim population itself, 
data can be analyzed regarding the national origin of the Muslim population, social status 
of Muslims, the employment and income levels, and the education levels achieved.  This 
body of data has brought one primary concept to the forefront: French Muslims appear to 
set themselves apart drastically from the Muslims within each of the other target 
countries.  In fact, statistics and reporting indicates Muslims in France feel a closer sense 
of equality within France than the other Muslim populations do in Europe to their host 
country.  Part of this may be explained through French governmental efforts both in its 
immigration policy of assimilation as well as efforts to handle Muslim concerns at the 
national level, creating a unified and predictable approach, vice conducting a piecemeal 
approach at the regional levels.  These actions have set France apart from Britain, Spain, 
and Germany which have attempted disjointed efforts in interacting with their Muslim 
populations.  This inability to satisfactorily appease Muslim concerns and provide some 
sense of movement towards equality has created hardships within the Muslim 
communities, distrust of the government, and established a potential target audience for 
jihadists.      
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Sentiment towards jihad has been varied amongst the Muslim populations within 
each European country.  Measuring that sentiment is based on internal factors as well as 
the ability of the jihadist message to spread.  From an internal perspective, Marc 
Sageman’s link theory approach to terrorist networks provides vital insight into the 
likelihood of attacks occurring.  Analysis has highlighted that groups with direct ties to 
the al Qaeda core have been involved in a significantly larger number of the successful 
and planned attacks within Europe.  These ties have proven to focus upon national origin.  
Many of the attacks have been carried out and planned by jihadists with Pakistani and 
Middle Eastern backgrounds, both of which have direct ties to al Qaeda’s core.  
Additionally, some North African groups were involved in training and support of al 
Qaeda during its tenure of terrorist training in Afghanistan.  The results of this theory 
help to account for the successful attacks which occurred within the UK and Spain, and 
may help to explain why Germany and France have not witnessed the violence firsthand 
since large segments of their populations originated from more secular countries as well 
as without the direct ties to al Qaeda’s core.   
In order for al Qaeda to spread its ideology, it must ensure the organization’s 
message resonates with the target audience.  Two factors are central in establishing 
support: negatively portraying a country’s foreign policy and the ability to interact and 
compete with other organizations.  As stated previously, the Iraq war is not the only 
foreign policy initiative which has provoked Muslims to take up jihad.  A more generic 
call for jihad has been to turn the war on terror into a perception of a war against Islam. 
As a result, any country involved in the war on terror can then be identified as an enemy 
of the jihadists.  This was witnessed against France, when Ayman al-Zawahiri united 
with AQIM in 2006 and proclaimed France a primary target of al Qaeda actions.  
Additionally, al Qaeda has tied actions (both present and colonial) of European countries 
with “apostate” regimes in Muslim lands into the notion of jihad.  This stems from the 
actions of France in Algeria, Great Britain in Pakistan, and Spain in Morocco and 
Algeria.  In spite of these proclamations for jihad, France and Germany have thus far 
avoided the Islamic terrorism experienced by Britain and Spain. 
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Recruitment has occurred in a myriad of locations, with mosques yielding the best 
results.  Governmental efforts to engage Muslim communities and minimize the influence 
mosques can have toward jihadist sentiment have helped to determine levels of jihadist 
action.  France has taken progressive steps to train homegrown religious leaders, deport 
radical sympathizers, and monitor mosques and religious leaders.  These efforts appear to 
be successful thus far.  The UK and Spain did not (until recently) take an aggressive 
stance within their Muslim communities against the spread of radical ideology, allowing 
foreign imams to preach in the local mosques with little to no surveillance.  Their 
inaction in the past likely helped the flow of support towards the jihadist ideology.   
From a counter radical perspective, it appears establishing legitimate Muslim 
associations which provide Muslims a go-between with the government has proven 
useful in reducing tensions and alleviating problems which arise within the Muslim 
community.  France and Germany are two examples of countries with key Muslim 
associations, the CFCM and DİTİB respectively, which have helped to bridge the divide 
between Muslims and non-Muslims.  Once again, Britain and Spain have either not been 
able to interact with Muslim organizations viewed as legitimate representatives of the 
Muslim populations or have avoided contact all together.   
The domestic strategy of each country is the final factor included in this study.  
Domestic strategies on two levels, immigration policies and countering terrorism, have 
played a role in jihadist actions.  Immigration policies selected by each country have 
determined how Muslim populations fit into the greater society.  Within France, Muslims 
were assimilated into the country.  As a result, religious and ethnic differences were set 
aside in an effort to see all citizens as equals.  Additionally, as tough issues arose or 
concerns were raised from within the Muslim community, French governmental officials 
attempted to tackle the issues rather than brushing them aside.  The multicultural 
approach adopted by Spain and Britain led to isolating Muslims from the greater societies 
and a led to feelings of alienation, magnifying the differences between the communities.  
Germany on the other hand, held onto a myth of the guest worker, where Muslims were 
not integrated into society under the notion that they would be returning to their home 
countries once their jobs were completed.        
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Looking at each country over the past few decades, it is readily apparent each has 
faced terrorism of some sort.  The form of terror and groups which projected it has helped 
to shape counter terror efforts today.  France, once again at the forefront, is the only 
country to have actually dealt with Islamic terrorism prior to 9/11.  Because of the actions 
of the GIA, an Algerian terrorist organization, in the mid 1990s, France got a ten year 
head start on contending with this unique threat; therefore, once Europe became 
threatened France only needed to fine tune its operations to maintain a positive effect.  
On the other hand, Great Britain, Spain, and Germany struggled trying to determine how 
to handle the new environment and fitting the threat into other domestic policies, namely 
governmental interaction with Muslim communities.  Likely due to its largely secular 
Muslim population and guest worker policy, Germany was the first of the other three 
countries to take progressive steps contending with Islamic terrorism.  Additionally, 
German officials took pro-active measures once it was discovered the country was not 
immune to radical Islam as the 9/11 Hamburg cell operated and plotted within the 
confines of German borders.  Spain and Great Britain were late entrants establishing 
progressive steps to combat Islamic extremism within each country.  It wasn’t until each 
suffered vicious attacks that domestic counter terrorism policies were radically changed.  
With both countries as late entrants into countering domestic terror threats, it will likely 
require greater time and effort to minimize the risks within each country. 
The critical takeaway from the analysis in this body of work is there are a number 
of vital factors which play a role in determining jihadist actions within each country.  
Although some analysts would like to pinpoint one factor as the most dominant, the 
reality is that no golden bullet exists.  The factors highlighted here can be overlaid onto 
other countries and then each analyzed to help determine which bears the most weight 
within each country.  The resulting data can then be used to begin developing effective 
counter terrorism policies based on examining what has been successful and what has 
failed in the four target countries in this study.  Looking at these lessons learned and 
recognizing each Muslim community as unique and varied will go a long way in ensuring 
the correct counter terrorism strategy is selected and employed.  Failing to do so will 
likely result in a continued dysfunctional fight against terrorism. 
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